A Critical Evaluation of the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 by Anton, Jennifer L.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 63 | Issue 4 Article 5
1998
A Critical Evaluation of the General Aviation
Revitalization Act of 1994
Jennifer L. Anton
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law
and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jennifer L. Anton, A Critical Evaluation of the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, 63 J. Air L. & Com. 759 (1998)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol63/iss4/5
A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE GENERAL AVIATION
REVITALIZATION ACT OF 1994
JENNIFER L. ANTON
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................................. 762
II. THE GENERAL AVIATION INDUSTRY ........... 764
A. WHAT IS THE GENERAL AvIATION INDUSTRY? .... 764
B. HISTORY OF INDUSTRY GROWrH ................. 765
C. DECLINE OF THE INDUSTRY ...................... 766
III. APPLICABLE LAW ................................. 766
IV. TORT REFORM EFFORTS AFFECTING THE
GENERAL AVIATION INDUSTRY ................. 767
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ........................... 767
B. PASSAGE OF GARA .............................. 770
1. The Proponents' Arguments for GARA ........ 770
2. The Oppositions' Arguments to GARA ......... 773
a. Why the General Aviation Industry
does not Deserve GARA ............... 773
b. Why the Industry's Arguments for
GARA are Wrong ...................... 775
V. STATUTORY ANALYSIS ........................... 777
A . O VERVIEW ...................................... 777
B. THE EFFECTIVE DATE ........................... 777
C. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES .......................... 779
1. Federal Preemption of State Products Liability
L aw ........................................ 779
2. GARA Conferring Subject Matter Jurisdiction
onto Federal Courts .......................... 780
3. Application of GARA to Accidents Occurring
Outside the United States ..................... 781
D. WHAT CONSTITUTES "GENERAL AVIATION
AIRCRAFT?" .. ..................................... 782
E. THE EIGHTEEN-YEAR STATUTE OF REPOSE ....... 784
F. WHO MAY ASSERT THE GARA DEFENSE? ........ 787
759
760 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [63
G. EXCEPTIONS TO THE APPLICATION OF GARA's
STATUTE OF REPOSE ............................... 789
1. Misrepresentation and Fraud Exception ........ 789
2. Emergency Exception ......................... 793
3. Exception for Persons Not On Board at Time of
A ccident .................................... 794
4. Warranty Exception .......................... 795
VI. THE EFFECTS OF GARA .......................... 795
A. GARA's EFFECT ON INDUSTRY LIABILITY ......... 795
B. GARA's EFFECT ON SMALL MANUFACTURERS .... 796
C. GARA's EFFECT ON COMPONENT PARTS
MANUFACTURERS ................................... 796
D. GARA's EFFECT ON OTHER INDUSTRY ACTORS .. 798
E. GARA's EFFECT ON CONSUMERS .................. 800
VII. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO GARA ................. 800
A. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE OF REPOSE .. 800
1. Open Courts/Due Process ..................... 801
2. Property Rights .............................. 802
3. Equal Protection ............................. 802
B. CIRCUMVENTING THE STATUTE OF REPOSE ...... 803
VIII. TOP ELEVEN REASONS WHY GARA IS
W R O N G ........................................... 806
A. MYTH #1: GARA WILL REMEDY THE PRODUCTS
LIABILITY CRISIS ..................................... 806
B. MYTH #2: 100,000 JOBS HAD BEEN LOST IN THE
GENERAL AVIATION INDUSTRY DUE TO EXCESSIVE
LIABILITY EXPOSURE PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT
OF GA RA ....................................... 807
C. MYTH #3: THE GENERAL AVIATION INDUSTRY WAS
FACING FINANCIAL DEVASTATION AS A RESULT OF
ITS EXPOSURE TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LAW SUITS ........................................ 808
D. MYTH #4: GARA WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE
MANUFACTURERS EXPERIENCED A DECREASE IN
GENERAL AVIATION SALES DUE TO PRODUCTS
LIABILITY COSTS BEING TOO HIGH, CAUSED BY A
DEFECT IN THE TORT SYSTEM (RATHER THAN BY
PRODUCT DEFECTS) ................................. 808
E. MYTH #5: THE DECLINE IN GENERAL AVIATION
AIRCRAFT SALES WAS DUE TO SOARING PRODUCTS
LIABILITY COSTS ..................................... 811
1. Oversupply .................................. 811
1998] GARA 761
2. Failure to Implement Product Improvement and
Innovation .................................. 811
3. High Operating Costs ........................ 812
4. Increased Complexity of the Aviation
Environment ................................ 812
5. Abolition of Favorable Tax Treatment for
Aircraft Acquistion ........................... 812
6. Competition for Expendable Income ............ 812
7. Other Factors ................................ 813
F. MYTH #6: AIRCRAFT "PROVE" THEMSELVES WITHIN
EIGHTEEN YEARS AND THUS ARE ENTITLED TO
IMMUNITY AFTER SUCH TIME ....................... 813
G. MYTH #7: BECAUSE THE NTSB DID NOT FIND A
DESIGN DEFECT AS A PROBABLE CAUSE OF AN
ACCIDENT, THE AIRCRAFT IS DEFECT-FREE ......... 814
H. MYTH #8: GARA WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE
DEFENDANTS HAVE SUCH A DIFFICULT TIME
DEFENDING OLDER AIRCRAFT DUE TO LOST OR
DESTROYED INFORMATION ........................... 815
I. MYTH #9: PASSAGE OF GARA WILL RESULT IN AN
INCREASE IN PRODUCTION AND JOBS .............. 816
J. MYTH #10: PRODUCTS HA VE BEEN DESIGNED AND
DEVELOPED TO INCREASE AIR SAFETY, BUT THE
MAKERS' FEAR OF EXPOSURE TO LIABILITY HAS
PREVENTED THEM FROM INTRODUCING AND
MARKETING THE PRODUCTS. IN OTHER WORDS,
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY STIFLES SAFETY ....... 816
K. MYrH #11: ENACTMENT OF GARA WILL ENABLE
CESSNA TO FULFILL ITS PROMISE TO RESTART
PRODUCTION OF SINGLE-ENGINE AIRCRAFT ........ 817
IX. CONCLUSION ..................................... 817
Except in topsy-turvy land you can't die before you are con-
ceived, or be divorced before ever you marry, or harvest a crop
never planted, or burn down a house never built, or miss a train
running on a non-existent railroad. For substantially similar rea-
sons, it has always heretofore been accepted, as a sort of legal
"axiom," that a statute of limitations does not begin to run
against a cause of action before that cause of action exists, i.e.,
before a judicial remedy is available to the plaintiff.'
I Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J.,
dissenting).
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I. INTRODUCTIONO N AUGUST 17, 1994, President Bill Clinton signed into law
the General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA), 2 which
purportedly was intended to help bolster the aviation industry
by relieving it from an "onslaught of product liability litigation."'
GARA is the first piece of federal legislation to establish rules
governing state law tort claims.4 GARA amended the Federal
Aviation Act by imposing an eighteen-year statute of repose on
all civil actions for death, injury or property damage caused by
general aviation aircraft and their component parts.5
The General Aviation Revitalization Act is the result of over a
decade of active Congressional lobbying by the manufacturers
of general aviation aircraft.6 GARA was enacted to "help regen-
erate a once-healthy industry and help create thousands of
jobs."7 Congress touted the statute as a "narrow and considered
response to the 'perceived' liability crisis in the general aviation
industry."' It was intended to "provide manufacturers of aircraft
and related components, protection from lawsuits alleging de-
fective design or manufacture long after original production."9
To achieve this result, GARA "cut[s] off the product[s] liability
tail10 for general aviation manufacturers of aircraft and compo-
nent parts after eighteen years."'1 GARA provides manufactur-
2 General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat.
1552 (1994) [hereinafter GARA].
3 Timothy S. McAllister, A "Tail" of Liability Reform: General Aviation Revitaliza-
tion Act of 1994 & the General Aviation Industry in the United States, 23 TRANSP. L.J.
301, 302 (1995) (quoting Gary W. Allen, The General Aviation Revitalization Act of
1994: Taming the Wild Blue?, LAWYER-PILOTS BAR ASS'N J., Summer 1994, at 6).
4 See Steven R. Pounian & Blanca Rodriquez, Recent Developments in Aviation
Law, 31 TORT & INS. L.J. 149, 160 (1996).
5 See GARA §§ 2(a), 3(3).
6 See infra Part [V.A.
7 Vicki Lawrence MacDougall, Products Liability Law in the Nineties: Will Federal
or State Law Control?, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 327, 340-41 (1995) (quoting
President's Statement Upon Signing General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994,
30 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1678 (Aug. 22, 1994)).
8 H.R. REP. No. 103-525(11), at 6 (1994).
9 David Moffitt, The Implications of Tort Reform for General Aviation: The General
Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, 1 SYRAcusEJ. LEGIS. & POL'Y 215, 220 (1995).
to In insurance law, the "liability tail" is the length of time during which a
tortfeasor may be subject to suit. The shorter the tail, the more predictable the
payout of claims over a period of time and thus, the more willing an insurance
company is to insure. Aircraft have long life spans, and thus, the potential for
lawsuits arising from the product extends over a long period of time; hence, the
long-tail of the aircraft's potential liability.
11 McAllister, supra note 3, at 311.
ers the ability to calculate a product's liability tail for insurance
purposes.12 The statute purports to relieve manufacturers from
products liability exposure, which in turn, will free up money
that can then be invested in research and development of new
and old piston-engine, general aviation aircraft.' 3 The re-start-
ing of the production of these designs by the established manu-
facturing companies will then revitalize the industry.
14
To effect the intent of Congress, GARA's statute of repose
bars injured plaintiffs from filing suit against manufacturers of
defective aircraft built prior to August 17, 1976. With the enact-
ment of GARA, approximately seventy-five percent of all general
aviation aircraft in the United States are exempted from any fu-
ture civil liability.15 In other words, close to three-quarters of
these small plane pilots and their passengers are "unable to re-
cover damages from an aircraft manufacturer in the event of a
crash or other injury, even if the cause of the accident is due to a
legitimate defect in the aircraft's design, manufacture or mar-
keting."' 6 GARA does not protect other actors in the general
aviation industry from liability.1 7 Pilots, mechanics and base op-
erators are still vulnerable to suit"' and will certainly bear the
burden of litigation costs as they become the named defendants
when accidents occur.
Most legal commentary on the General Aviation Revitalization
Act analyzes the provisions of the Act and describes the reasons
for which the Act was enacted. There is sparse discussion re-
garding the Act's potential negative effects on those not pro-
tected, but nonetheless affected, by GARA's statute of repose.
This paper closely scrutinizes GARA's effects on those industry
actors and accident victims and explains why the general avia-
tion manufacturers' arguments in support of GARA's enactment
12 See id. at 316.
13 See id.
14 See id.
15 See Robert F. Hedrick, A Close and Critical Analysis of the New General Aviation
Revitalization Act, 62 J. AIR L. & CoM. 385, 418-19 (1996)
[B]ecause of the boom in the late 1970s and the bust since the
early 1980s, the current and immediate rate of increase [in] aircraft
covered by GARA is astounding. By 1995, 58% of the aircraft were
covered. By 1996, 68% were covered; the number is expected to
rise to 77% by 1997 and to 85% by 1998.
16 Patrick J. Shea, Note, Solving America's General Aviation Crisis: The Advantages
of Federal Preemption over Tort Reform, 80 CORNELL L. Riv. 747, 784 (1995).
17 See McAllister, supra note 3, at 311-12.
18 See H.R. REP. No. 103-525(11), at 7 (1994).
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were misleading. The Article begins by introducing the general
aviation industry and its history. The Article then briefly dis-
cusses the products liability law on which the Act is based.
Thirdly, the Article traces the legislative history of the Act, in-
cluding the arguments made by both the proponents and oppo-
nents of the Act. Next is an in-depth analysis of the statute and
the case law interpreting it. The Article then focuses on the dif-
ferent general aviation industry actors by describing how each
group is affected by the Act. An analysis of the constitutionality
of GARA follows. The Article concludes by returning to the ar-
guments presented by the proponents and opponents of GARA
and reexaminining why GARA should not have been enacted.
This final section criticizes the legislative policies relied upon by
Congress and describes why the general aviation industry's argu-
ments in support of GARA's enactment were fallacious.
II. THE GENERAL AVIATION INDUSTRY
A. WHAT IS THE GENERAL AVIATION INDUSTRY?1 9
"General aviation is defined as all private-sector aviation that
does not involve regularly scheduled passenger traffic. ' 20 Gen-
eral aviation includes the construction, maintenance and flight
operations of aircraft such as corporate jets, helicopters, and
home-built sailplanes. 21 General aviation manufacturers build
general aviation aircraft, major aircraft components (e.g. en-
gines and propellers), and smaller components. 22 Operators of
general aviation aircraft provide a variety of aviation services
that are not efficiently provided by alternative modes of trans-
portation. 23 Such services include: pilot training, crop-dusting,
emergency medical evacuation, business aviation, air cargo,
flight training, pleasure flying, air taxi, and air charter.24 "Gen-
eral aviation aircraft also provide passenger service in areas that
commercial airlines are unwilling or unable to service. ' 25 "Over
19 See infra Part V.D.
20 John H. Boswell & George Andrew Coats, Saving the General Aviation Industry:
Putting Tort Reform to the Test, 60J. AIR L. & COM. 533, 535 (1995).
21 See McAllister, supra note 3, at 303.
22 See Boswell & Coats, supra note 20, at 535.
23 See Scott E. Tarry & LawrenceJ. Truitt, Rhetoric & Reality: Tort Reform and the
Uncertain Future of General Aviation, 61 J. AIR L. & COM. 163, 167 (1995).
24 See id.; see also Boswell & Coats, supra note 20, at 535.
2-5 Tarry & Truitt, supra note 23, at 167.
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5000 communities rely solely on general aviation for their access
to the nation's airways. "26
The general aviation industry is composed of a variety of ac-
tors, including the "Big Three" airframe manufacturers (Cessna
Aircraft Co., Piper Aircraft Corp., and Beech Aircraft Corp.),
small airframe manufacturers, and component parts manufac-
turers.27 It also includes dealers, fixed base operators (FBOs),
kit-plane manufacturers, private flight instructors, mechanics,
and pilots. 28
A general aviation aircraft is statutorily defined as an aircraft,
approved by the Federal Aviation Administration, that seats less
than twenty passengers and that is not engaged in scheduled
passenger operations.29
B. HISTORY OF INDUSTRY GROWTH
A plethora of trained pilots, aircraft mechanics, and aero-en-
gineers emerged from the aftermath of World War II, eager to
test their innovative and entrepreneurial spirits in the industry
of general aviation manufacturing.3 0 They began building "a
multitude of single- and multi-engine light piston aircraft" in
their "backyard garages, [in] small-town factories, and [in] ma-
jor manufacturers' plants."''1  The skies were becoming filled
with "new designs from manufacturers like Cessna, Piper,
Beech, Stinson, and Luscombe.' '32 Small town airports became
popular, and surplus military airfields were rapidly being con-
verted to civilian use.3 3 Ex-army air corps personnel provided
aircraft maintenance, fuel services, sales support, and pilot train-
ing for the next generation. 4
The tremendous increase in the number of pilots flying and
the number of aircraft being produced lasted throughout the
26 Steven L. England & Christopher C. McNatt, Jr., Symposium on the General
Aviation Revitalization Act: The Push for Statutes of Repose in General Aviation, 23
TRANsp. L.J. 323, 324 (1995).
27 See McAllister, supra note 3, at 303.
28 See id.; Ladd Sanger, Note, Will the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994
Allow the Industry to Fly High Once Again ?, 20 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 435, 435
(1995).
29 See GARA § (2) (c).
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1960s and 1970s. 5 During these two decades, the "Big Three"
created a comprehensive product line of general aviation air-
craft, established an infrastructure that provided sales and train-
ing, and aggressively marketed the industry of general
aviation.6
C. DECLINE OF THE INDUSTRY
In the 1980s general aviation first began to stagnate and then
to decline. 7 The 1990s saw further decline as demand for gen-
eral aviation products and services continued to wane. 38 Gen-
eral aviation ownership gradually became more of a luxury and
less accessible to the average American.3 9 As a result, produc-
tion began to stall and then virtually ceased.40
During this period, the industry's annual production of gen-
eral aviation aircraft plunged from over 17,000 aircraft in 1979
to 2600 in 1983. 4' Cessna, the largest manufacturer of general
aviation aircraft, ceased production of piston-engined aircraft in
1986.42 By 1993 production had further decreased to 954
aircraft.43
In the mid-1980s the industry began to attribute the decline
in manufacturing to an alleged increase in the cost of insuring
and defending products liability actions relating to defective de-
sign and manufacture.44 Manufacturers concluded that they
needed to limit their exposure to products liability actions in
order to assure a revival of the production of light piston aircraft
for general aviation use.45
III. APPLICABLE LAW
Products liability is a term of art that refers to the "liability of a
manufacturer or seller of a chattel which is defective and/or un-
reasonably dangerous and causes" injury to an individual.46
'15 See id.
36 See id. at 304-05.
37 See id.
3M See id. at 305.
39 See id. at 305-06.
40 See id. at 306.
41 See Sanger, supra note 28, at 436.
42 See S. REP. No. 103-202, at 3 (1993).
43 See H.R. REP. No. 103-525(I), at 2 (1994).
44 See McAllister, supra note 3, at 306.
45 See id. at 307.
46 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 641 (4th ed. 1971).
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There are at least four objectives of liability law: (1) to compen-
sate accident victims; (2) to deter injurers; (3) to spread risk
equitably; and (4) to foster innovation and safety.4 7 American
law generally provides three theories to plaintiffs who seek to
recover against manufacturers: (a) warranty (contractual rem-
edy); (b) strict liability (tort remedy); and (c) negligence (tort
remedy) .48 General aviation litigation is dominated by tort
claims.49
Because the tort liability laws governing aircraft litigation are
governed by state law, there is some variation among jurisdic-
tions.5" The majority of states allow liability for a defective prod-
uct to extend throughout the entire life of the product, with the
statute of limitations beginning to run only after an injury oc-
curs.5 However, a minority of states have enacted statutes of
repose which cut off a plaintiffs right to bring a cause of action
after a specified time, measured from the delivery of a product,
regardless of the time of accrual of the cause of action.52 A stat-
ute of repose extinguishes a plaintiff's cause of action before it
can ever arise.53
IV. TORT REFORM EFFORTS AFFECTING THE GENERAL
AVIATION INDUSTRY
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
While the general aviation manufacturing industry was exper-
iencing economic difficulty, its members began to lobby the fed-
eral government for reform of the tort system, particularly in the
47 See Tarry & Truitt, supra note 23, at 167-68.
48 See Moffitt, supra note 9, at 217.
49 See id.
50 See id. at 218.
51 See id.
52 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1411 (6th ed. 1990). When GARA was signed,
sixteen states had statutes of repose that ran for either the "useful safe life" of the
product or from five to twelve years. See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-116-105
(Michie 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-107 (West 1997); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 52-577a (1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-106 [51-1-11] (1991 & Supp. 1997);
IDAHO CODE § [6-1403] 6-1303 (1990); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-213 (West
1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5 (Michie 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3303
(1994); MINN. STAT. § 604.03 (1988); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224 (1995); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-50(6) (1996); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.905 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-28-103 (1980); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.72.060 (West 1992). For a more
in-depth discussion regarding state statutes of repose, see England & McNatt,
supra note 26.
53 See Sanger, supra note 28, at 447.
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area of aviation products liability.54 They pushed for reform at
the "[f] ederal level, where it was believed that the overarching
[f]ederal authority over aviation safety offered the best chance
of achieving uniformity of legislation."55 Congress believed that
federal legislation was justified in this instance because aircraft
were considered unique when compared to other products. 56
Because much of the general aviation industry is based in
Kansas, 57 members of the Kansas congressional delegation be-
came the primary sponsors of legislation aimed at revitalizing
the industry.58 In 1986 legislators introduced a series of Senate
and House bills calling for the uniformity of personal injury and
property damage liability rules arising out of general aviation
accidents. 59 For example, House Resolution 4142,60 introduced
by Representative Dan Glickman (D-Kan.), provided for a uni-
form federal aviation products liability law, eliminated joint and
several liability (except for defects in airplanes or their parts),
and barred suits for injuries caused by products that had ex-
ceeded their useful lives. 61 A twenty-year statute of repose ap-
peared in the Senate's General Aviation Accident Liability
Standards Act of 1986.62
The following year, new bills with new names were introduced
in furtherance of the reform effort.63 House members intro-
duced the General Aviation Standards Act of 1987.64 In the Sen-
ate, Senator Nancy Kassenbaum (R-Kan.) introduced the
General Aviation Accident Liability Standards Act of 1987,65
which contained "comprehensive rules on liability, comparative
responsibility, and remedial measures designed to ease the bur-
54 See McAllister, supra note 3, at 308-09.
55 Id. at 309; see generally H.R. REP. No. 103-525(11), at 7 (1994); MacDougall,
supra note 7, at 341.
56 See MacDougall, supra note 7, at 341.
57 Beech, Cessna and Learjet manufacture their products in Wichita, Kansas.
See England & McNatt, supra note 26, at 326 n.17.
58 See id. at 326.
59 See Albert Lin, Comment, Jurisdictional Splashdown: Should Aviation Torts Find
Solace in Admiralty?, 60J. AIR. L. & COM. 409, 444 (1994).
60 H.R. REs. 4142, 99th Cong. (1986).
61 See id.
62 S. 2794, 99th Cong. (1986); see Todd R. Steggerda, GARA's Achilles: The Prob-
lematic Application of the Knowing Misrepresentation Exception, 24 TRANSP. LJ. 191,
225 (1997).
63 See Steggerda, supra note 62, at 226.
64 H.R. 2238, 100th Cong. (1987).
65 S. 473, 100th Cong. (1987).
den of liability insurance on aviation manufacturers. ' 66 The
proposal also provided the federal courts with original jurisdic-
tion, concurrent with state courts, in all civil actions arising out
of aviation accidents.67 Congress killed both the Kassenbaum
bill and the similar House version.68
In 1989 Congress again refused to pass legislation virtually
identical to the Kassenbaum bill.69 The Committee on the Judi-
ciary rejected the bills because it had difficulty blaming the gen-
eral aviation industry's decline solely on increased liability
insurance premiums.7 0 During the next three years, Senator
Kassenbaum introduced two more versions of the General Avia-
tion Accident Liability Standards Act, both of which Congress
rejected. y
In September of 1993, during the 103rd Congress, Senator
Kassenbaum introduced Senate Bill 1458, known as the General
Aviation Revitalization Act.7 2 In the House, Congressman Glick-
man introduced an identical bill.73 The scope of this bill was
limited to the singular issue of creating a fifteen-year statute of
repose on civil actions brought against general aircraft manufac-
turers and manufacturers of general aviation component
parts.74 The restricted scope of this bill significantly improved
its chances for passage.7"
The bill passed out of committee in the Senate with the fif-
teen-year statute of repose. 76 However, the bill ultimately passed
by the entire Senate contained an eighteen-year repose period.7
The Senate passed the bill on March 16, 1994, by a margin of
ninety-one to eight.7 8
The House version of the Senate Bill, H.R. 3087, also in-
cluded a fifteen-year statute of repose in its original form.79
66 Lin, supra note 59, at 445-46.
67 See id. at 446.
6 See id. at 449.
69 See id.
70 See S. REP. No. 101-303, at 3 (1990).
71 See S. 645, 102d Cong. (1991); S. 67, 103d Cong. (1993); see also Lin, supra
note 59, at 450.
72 S. 1458, 103d Cong. (1993).
73 See H.R. 3087, 103d Cong. (1993).
74 See Lin, supra note 59, at 450.
75 See id. at 450-51.
76 See Steggerda, supra note 62, at 226.
77 See id. at 227.
78 See id. at 226. There is virtually no legislative history describing the reason
for increasing the repose period from 15 to 18 years.
79 Id. at 228.
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However, the Aviation Subcommittee of the House Public
Works and Transportation Committee amended the bill's stat-
ute of repose to eighteen years.80 On June 27, 1994, the House
passed a compromise bill and two months later, President Clin-
ton signed the bill into law."1 On August 17, 1994, President
Clinton touted the bill as "legislation that accommodates the
need to revitalize our general aviation industry, while preserving
the legal rights of passengers and pilots. 8s2 GARA became effec-
tive immediately upon its passage and is not applicable to civil
actions commenced before the date of enactment.8 3
B. PASSAGE OF GARA
1. The Proponents' Arguments for GARA
The general aviation manufacturing industry wholeheartedly
supported GARA and was represented primarily by the General
Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA), the Aircraft Own-
ers and Pilots Association (AOPA), the Experimental Aircraft
Association, the International Association of Machinists, the He-
licopter Association International, the National Business Air-
craft Association, and the National Air Transportation
Association. 4 The proponents of the bill argued that its passage
was necessary in order to relieve the general aviation industry
from burdensome strict products liability verdicts and associated
defense costs as well as resulting increased insurance premiums.
They argued that these factors led to the demise of a once vital
and prosperous industry. The proponents asserted that GARA
would necessarily eliminate manufacturers' exposure to liability
after their products had proven their integrity.8 "
According to Congressional testimony, small airplane manu-
facturing and production decreased from over 17,000 aircraft
annually in the United States in the late 1970s to under 1000 per
80 See id. at 230. There is virtually no legislative history describing the reason
for increasing the repose period from 15 to 18 years.
11 See id. at 231.
82 Statement of President William J. Clinton Upon Signing S. 1458, 30 WEEKLY
CoMP. PRKs. Doc. 1678 (Aug. 17, 1994).
83 See GARA §§ (4) (a)-(b).
84 See Hedrick, supra note 15, at 386.
85 See General Aviation Act of 1993: Hearing on H.R. 3087 Before the Subcomm. on
Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transp., 103d Cong. 133 (1993)
[hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 3087] (statement of Russell W. Meyer, Jr., Chairman
and CEO, Cessna Aircraft Co.).
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year in 1993.86 Single-engine piston-driven aircraft production
decreased from 14,000 aircraft in 1978 to 555 in 1993.87 Cessna,
one of the nation's largest small aircraft manufacturers, in its
heyday produced an average of 6500 aircraft annually.88 How-
ever, in 1986, Cessna ceased manufacture of single-engine air-
planes entirely.8 9
Along with this decline in production came a loss of jobs.90
An estimated 100,000 jobs were lost throughout the entire in-
dustry9 1-20,000 in the general aviation manufacturing industry
and 80,000 in related industries (e.g. aircraft sales and
service) .92
During the 1980s accident litigation and defense costs in the
general aviation industry steadily escalated. 93 Aircraft manufac-
turers were forced to shift a greater proportion of their re-
sources to defending lawsuits and compensating plaintiffs. 94
"According to GAMA, in 1976, total product liability costs, in-
cluding claim and defense costs for light aircraft airframe and
component manufacturers, were $24 million. 95 By 1986 the to-
tal costs of products liability for light aircraft reached $210 mil-
lion.96 In 1987 the "Big Three" calculated that their "annual
costs for product liability ranged from $70,000 to $100,000 per
unit built and shipped during the year. 97
Manufacturers attributed the drop in general aviation aircraft
production to the "tremendous increase in the industry's [prod-
ucts] liability insurance costs."98 According to Cessna Chair-
man, Russell W. Meyer, the reason for ceasing production of
86 See H.R. REP. No. 103-525(I), at 2 (1994).
87 See id.
88 See General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1993: Hearing on S. 1458 Before the
Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 103d
Cong. 1 (1993) (statement of Russell W. Meyer, Jr., Chairman and CEO, Cessna
Aircraft Co.).
89 See General Aviation Revitalization Act: Hearing on H.R. 3087 and S. 1458 Before
the Subcomm. on Econ. and Commercial Law of the House Judiciary Comm., 103d Cong.
1 (1994) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 3087 and S. 1458] (statement of Russell W.
Meyer, Jr., Chairman and CEO, Cessna Aircraft Co.).
90 See H.R. REP. No. 103-525(I), at 2 (1994).
91 See S. RFP. No. 103-202, at 2 (1993).
92 See H.R. REP. No. 103-525(I), at 2 (1994).
93 See Tarry & Truitt, supra note 23, at 179.
94 See id.
95 S. REP. No. 103-202, at 3 (1993).
96 See id.
97 Tarry & Truitt, supra note 23, at 180.
98 H.R. REP. No. 103-525(I), at 1 (1994).
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single-engine airplanes was "[s]olely because of the unlimited
cost of products liability."99 Manufacturers have the deepest
pockets "in a chain of potential liability," but are the least re-
sponsible for the ongoing safety of aircraft produced many years
ago.100 Thus, GARA's statute of repose would still allow poten-
tial plaintiffs to seek recovery from the party most directly re-
sponsible for their loss-e.g., a mechanic who negligently
repaired a part or the manufacturer of a defective replacement
part.101
The industry argued that it deserved this legislative protection
because plaintiffs continued to pursue litigation against manu-
facturers even when the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) accident findings did not uncover aircraft defects.102
Furthermore, GARA would enable the industry to avoid having
to contend with the difficulties associated with constructing a
good defense in actions concerning older products.10 3 These
difficulties arise "because of the obstacle of securing
evidence."° 4
Proponents of the Act argued that its passage would lead to:
(1) 25,000 new jobs in the industry within five years;10 5 (2)
100,000 new jobs within the support industries;" 6 (3) greater
student pilot start-ups leading to an increased supply of pilots
and aircraft mechanics;" 7 (4) increased spending on research
and development;'0 8 and (5) an improved balance of trade due
to greater exporting. 1 9 Cessna even promised to restart piston
aircraft production and to produce 2000 new aircraft per year in
99 Hearing on H.R. 3087 and S. 1458, supra note 89 (statement of Russell W.
Meyer Jr., Chairman and CEO, Cessna Aircraft Co.).
100 Moffitt, supra note 9, at 223.
101 See id.
102 See Robert Martin, General Aviation Manufacturing: An Industry Under Seige, in
THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION
485-86 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991).
103 See MODEL UNIF. PROD. LIAB. ACT, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,734 (1979).
104 Id.
105 See Hearing on H.R. 3087 and S. 1458, supra note 89 (statement of Russell W.
Meyer Jr., Chairman and CEO, Cessna Aircraft Co.).
106 See id.
107 See id.
108 See Geoffrey M. Hand, Comment, Should Juries Decide Aircraft Design? Cleve-
land v. Piper Aircraft Corp. and Federal Preemption of State Tort Law, 29 U.S.F. L. REV.
741, 798 (1995).
109 See Hearing on H.R 3087, supra note 85, at 51 (statement of Russell W.
Meyer, Jr., Chairman and CEO, Cessna Aircraft Co.).
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exchange for the passage of GARA. 11° These predictions and
promises, of course, assume that excessive liability was, in fact,
the principal cause of the industry's difficulties, and that a stat-
ute of repose is, in fact, a sufficient remedy.111
Interestingly, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
(AOPA) also supported GARA. 112 Pilots are frequently the
plaintiffs in these lawsuits, and their support of the bill was cer-
tainly persuasive. Opponents of GARA were (and continue to
be) baffled by the AOPA's support and criticize its President,
Phil Boyer, for having "sold out" its members by supporting the
legislation." 3
2. The Oppositions'Arguments to GARA
a. Why the General Aviation Industry does not Deserve
GARA
The American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA) and con-
sumer groups such as Citizen Action and Public Citizen joined
together to fight against enactment of GARA's statute of re-
pose."' These groups were opposed to tort reform legislation
favoring general aviation manufacturers for several reasons.
First, they complained about the inequity in offering liability
protection to a particular industry." 5 They queried why an in-
dustry "that was enjoying great profitability [should] be granted
tort immunity for up to 50 years of economic activity[.]' 16
Beech and Cessna made record profits in 1992 and 1993.117 To-
tal revenues in the industry hit $2.1 billion, the highest level
since 1981.11 The opponents argued that
[t] he extent of the profitability of the "Big Three" as of 1992 was
impressive: Cessna was sold to Textron for $100 million. Beech
recorded its highest revenues ever. Cessna and Beech both tran-
110 See H.R. REP. No. 103-525(11), at 5 (1994); S. REP. No. 103-202, at 2 (1993).
M See Moffitt, supra note 9, at 221.
112 See Hearing on H.R. 3087, supra note 85, at 57 (statement of Phil Boyer,
President, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association).
113 See Daniel Donnelly et al., The General Aviation Revitalization Act Panel Discus-
sion, 63J. AIR L. & CoM. 169, 179 (1997).
114 See McAllister, supra note 3, at 309; England & McNatt, supra note 26, at
327.
115 See McAllister, supra note 3, at 309.
116 Id. at 309 n.42.
117 See Philip Shuchman, It Isn't That the Tort Lawyers Are So Right, It's Just That
the Tort Reformers Are So Wrong, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 485, 530 (1997).
118 See Hearing on H.R. 3087, supra note 85, at 110 (statement of Robert B.
Creamer, Citizen Action).
1998] GARA
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
sitioned into production of corporate jets and multi-engine tur-
bine aircraft. These aircraft are more profitable than single- or
multi-engine light piston aircraft by a factor of ten. In light of
this, ATLA argued that any reduction in liability would not assure
production of light piston aircraft by the "Big Three."119
The opponents attacked the manufacturers' allegation that
products liability judgments had driven up insurance defense
costs so high that aircraft could not be produced or sold at rea-
sonable prices. 12 ° They asserted that "[t]he problem is not one
of excessive cost; the problem is one of limited demand. Pilots,
businesses, flying clubs, fixed base operations-none of them
buy new airplanes because they can get essentially the same
thing for less money in a used airplane." 121 Used aircraft cost
between one-half and one-fourth that of new aircraft and are
considered by pilots to be of essentially the same quality. 122
Furthermore, during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the aviation
industry flooded the market with airplanes. 12 "The market ma-
tured and new sales collapsed. This had nothing to do with the
costs of product liability, except that the cost of meeting the lia-
bility exposure of the entire fleet had to be spread over a greatly
reduced number of new unit sales.' 24
AT[A also argued that limiting liability would deprive injured
pilots and passengers of their rights to compensation. 125 They
insisted that "the fact that general aviation is viewed as an 'inher-
ently dangerous activity' mitigates against any lessening of the
standard of care applied to general aviation products.' 2
ATLA protested that the industry was not deserving of tort
reform in light of "the laxity of [Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA)] certification standards and the certification process." 127
The industry did not deserve GARA's protection because "FAA
certification standards with respect to [certain] safety issues ...
do not bring the number of defective products to an acceptable
119 McAllister, supra note 3, at 309 n.42.
120 See Hearing on H.t. 3087, supra note 85, at 111 (statement of Robert B.
Creamer, Citizen Action).
121 Id.
122 See id. at 112.
123 See id.
124 Id.
125 See McAllister, supra note 3, at 309 n.42.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 309.
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level. 12 8 Furthermore, the general aviation manufacturing in-
dustry did not deserve special protection because of "manufac-
turer collusion in the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) accident investigations. 129
Opponents also argued that GARA would reduce manufactur-
ers' financial incentives for providing aircraft safety and would
"severely limit the rights of the innocent victims of aircraft acci-
dents to receive fair compensation for their injuries.' 130
b. Why the Industry's Arguments for GARA are Wrong
ATLA asserted that the general aviation industry's decline was
not due primarily to increased products liability costs, but rather
to a variety of other factors. They argued that the decline was
due to (1) industry mismanagement;1 3 ' (2) increased fuel
prices; 132 (3) the Gulf War; 133 (4) the elimination of the invest-
ment tax credit formerly applicable to the purchase of some air-
craft; 134 (5) the lack of trained pilots; 135 (6) the increase in the
market for used planes;13 6 (7) the 10% luxury tax imposed in
1990; 137 (8) the durability, quality and longevity of existing air-
craft;13 8 (9) the increased availability of kit-type aircraft; 131 (10)
128 Id. at 309 n.43. For example, "[t]he FAA did not require shoulder har-
nesses until 1973, even though it was known for years that they would materially
cut down on fatalities in crashes." Hearing on HR. 3087, supra note 85, at 116
(statement of Robert B. Creamer, Citizen Action). Furthermore, there were sev-
eral types of aircraft that had chronic defects that went for several years without
implementation of any FAA mandated corrective action programs:
Cessna 411 with lack of rudder authority during single engine oper-
ations. - Cessna 210 with bladder fuel tanks that trap water. -
Mooney Turbo 210 with vapor lock. -V-Tail Beech Bonanzas with a
basic design flaw due to lack of aeronautical knowledge during the
1950's. - Lear 23 crashes ([of which] over 50% of the aircraft built
have crashed). - Piper Malibu with an unprecedented number of
crashe[s] due possibly to a defective autopilot.
McAllister, supra note 3, at 309 n.43.
129 McAllister, supra note 3, at 310.
130 Hearing on H.R. 3087, supra note 85, at 109 (statement of Robert B.
Creamer, Citizen Action).
131 See Sanger, supra note 28, at 442.
132 See id.
133 See id.
134 See H.R. REP. No. 103-525(11), at 5 (1994).
135 See id.
136 See id.
137 See id.; S. REP. No. 103-202, at 2 (1993).
138 See S. REP. No. 103-202, at 2 (1993).
139 See id.
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the relatively inexpensive cost of buying used aircraft;14 ° (11)
airline deregulation legislation resulting in lower prices and a
surge in commercial airline traffic;'41 and (12) concentration of
the general aviation industry in the more profitable jet aircraft
market. 14 2
Opponents rejected the manufacturers' theory that aviation
liability insurance premiums would decline in the wake of
GARA's enactment, because, they argued, the insurance rates
did not increase in the first place because of the costs of
claims.'43 The insurance rate increase in the 1980s was attribu-
table to "conditions in the investment markets, changes in insur-
ance industry investment practices, and the so called 'insurance
cycle."" 44 None of the changes in the cost of insurance premi-
ums has any relationship to fluctuations in the volume of under-
lying claims. 45 If the manufacturers want their insurance
premiums to decrease, opponents argued, they should lobby
Congress to address the liability insurance companies' practices,
especially its uncompetitive nature."'
Furthermore, opponents asserted, "[t]o significantly increase
piston engine sales requires one of three factors: a significant
increase in the number of piston engine pilots and hours flown;
product innovation that gives a purchaser a reason to buy a new
instead of used aircraft; or the rapid deterioration of many older
piston airplanes."' 47 GARA will have no effect on any of these. 4 '
In addition, GARA "will not improve demand for piston en-
gine airplanes"-it will merely cut manufacturers' costs. 149 The
opposition asserted,
Of course we could have the same effect by cutting the wages of
employees, or cutting taxes, or providing an outright subsidy to
these companies. We do not believe such a subsidy is warranted
in this marketplace. But more important [sic], limiting the
rights of victims to recover damages has two terrible side effects:
it reduces the financial incentive to safety and it takes money
140 See id.
141 See id.
142 See H.R. REP. No. 103-525(11), at 5 (1994).
143 See Hearing on H.R. 3087, supra note 85, at 114 (statement of Robert B.
Creamer, Citizen Action).
144 Id.
145 See id. at 115.
146 See id.
147 Id. at 113.
148 See id. at 114.
149 Id. at 115.
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from those who should be the last to contribute-the victims of
accidents.1 50
The opposition put it simply: Of course Cessna wants this bill.
Cessna is currently liable for any accident that is the result of the
negligent production or design of any of the 160,000 aircraft it
has built that is still in service. Under this bill Cessna would be
liable for only the 21,000 aircraft (only 13% of the total) that
were built after 1976.'15
V. STATUTORY ANALYSIS
A. OVERVIEW
The General Aviation Revitalization Act amended the Federal
Aviation Act by adding section 1119, which provides an eighteen
year statute of repose on all civil actions for death, injury, or
property damage caused by general aviation aircraft and their
component parts. 152 GARA prohibits a person from bringing
suit for death, injury, or property damage that occurs while on
board a general aviation aircraft that was manufactured more
than eighteen years prior to the accident. 15 3 GARA is a "rolling"
statute of repose. 54 This means that when a particular part in
an aircraft is replaced by a new part, the eighteen year period
begins again for the replacement part.
155
There are four instances in which GARA's statute of repose
will not be invoked: (1) when the manufacturer knowingly mis-
represents certain safety information to the FAA; (2) when the
injured person was a passenger for purposes of receiving treat-
ment for a medical or other emergency; (3) when the injured
person was not aboard the aircraft at the time of the accident; or
(4) when a written warranty by the manufacturer provides for
more than eighteen years protection. 56
B. THE EFFECTIVE DATE
The General Aviation Revitalization Act's statute of repose be-
came effective on the date of its enactment, which was August
150 Id. at 115-16.
151 Id. at 116.
152 See GARA §§ 2(a), 3(3).
153 See id.
154 See H.R. REP. No. 103-525(I), at 3 (1994).
155 See id.
156 See GARA §§ 2(b) (1)-(4).
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17, 1994.157 The Act does not apply to civil actions commenced
before the date of enactment.
158
The issue of GARA's effective date was addressed by a Califor-
nia federal district court in Altseimer v. Bell Helicopter Textron,
Inc.159 In Altseimer, the accident occurred prior to August 17,
1994 (the effective date of the Act), but the plaintiffs did not file
their complaint until May 23, 1995.160 The court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that GARA should not apply because the
cause of action accrued prior to the effective date. 161 The court
held that because the plaintiffs' claims were filed after the effec-
tive date of the statute, their claims were subject to GARA's pre-
emptive provisions.
162
The applicability provision was also interpreted in Cartman v.
Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division, 63 where the action
accrued and the original complaint was filed prior to GARA's
enactment. 164 The issue in Cartman was not whether the origi-
nal cause of action was preempted by GARA's provisions.
Rather, the plaintiff argued that his amended petition, joining
another defendant and filed seven months after the effective
date of GARA, related back to the original complaint and thus
was not preempted by GARA. 165 The court rejected the plain-
tiffs argument and treated the plaintiffs amended complaint as
a separate claim.'66 Thus, GARA precluded the products liabil-
ity claim against the new defendant.167
The Cartman decision potentially affects those claims that
were filed prior to GARA, but in which discovery is still active. 6 '
GARA "erects a serious barrier to the addition of defendants
through an amended complaint.' ' 69 Unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the amended complaint relates back to the
157 Id. § 4(a).
158 See id. § 4(b).
159 919 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Cal. 1996).
160 See id. at 342.
161 See id.
162 See id.
163 No. 94-CV-72582-DT, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20189 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27,
1996).
164 See id. at *6.
165 See id. at *7.
166 See id. at *8.
167 See id. at *12.




original, the amended complaint will stand as a separate claim
and will be subject to GARA's statute of repose. y17
C. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
1. Federal Preemption of State Products Liability Law
GARA is the first piece of federal legislation to establish fed-
eral rules governing state products liability laws. 171 The federal
government has long been reluctant to impose federal regula-
tions on issues that are traditionally governed by state common
law, such as tort law.172 It has also been hesitant to impose na-
tional standards that preempt state law because it recognizes
that "an individual's right to sue is grounded in state common
law that reflects the experiences of the legal system and the val-
ues of the citizens of a particular state. "173 The federal govern-
ment also wants to avoid the likely procedural and jurisdictional
confusion that accompanies such interference.
174
Clearly, Congress believed it was appropriate to impose regu-
lations affecting state tort law concerning the general aviation
industry.1 75 The general aviation industry was different because
the industry is subjected to strict regulation by the federal gov-
ernment.1 7 6 The regulatory oversight exists from the cradle to
the grave.' 77 There are federal inspections and certifications of
aircraft; 171 federal training, testing and certification of pilots;
79
and FAA regulation of air routes, fuel handling operations and
aviation accidents.' 80 Congress also justified its interference
with state law by touting the statute as a very limited federal
preemption.18 1
GARA's statute of repose does not affect state courts' rights to
adjudicate aviation products liability cases involving "claims for
defective design or manufacture."' 182 GARA only supersedes
state law to the extent that a state's law permits a such a civil
170 See id.
171 See Pounian & Rodriquez, supra note 4, at 160.
172 See Conning the IADC Newsletters, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 297, 301 (1995).
173 Id.
174 See id.
175 See H.R. REP. No. 103-525(11), at 4 (1994).
176 See id. at 6.
177 See id. at 5.
178 See id.
179 See id.
180 See id. at 6.
18, See id. at 4.
182 McAllister, supra note 3, at 312.
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action to be brought after the eighteen year period."8 3 State
products liability law continues to govern products liability ac-
tions for defective aircraft design or manufacture and state com-
mon law governs all actions for damages.'84 GARA specifically
states that its statute of repose "supersedes any State law to the
extent that such law permits a civil action.., to be brought after
the applicable limitation period for such civil action ... ."85
2. GARA Conferring Subject Matter Jurisdiction onto Federal Courts
An example of the limited nature of GARA's preemptive
scope is found in Wright v. Bond-Air, Ltd., 6 where the defend-
ants tried to use GARA as a means for conferring subject matter
jurisdiction on the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.87 In
this case, James M. Wright, Jr. was flying a twin-engine Cessna
when he was killed in a fatal crash. 188 His estate filed a wrongful
death and products liability lawsuit in state court, alleging negli-
gence and breach of warranty.'89 The defendants removed the
case to federal court by asserting that the court had subject mat-
terjurisdiction over the case. 9 ° They argued that the case arose
under federal law, e.g. GARA.' 9' The plaintiff moved to remand
the case back to state court, based on lack of federal
jurisdiction. 192
The defendants argued that federal jurisdiction was proper
because, under the "artful pleading" exception to the well-
pleaded complaint rule, the plaintiff had disguised the federal
nature of its state law claim. 193 The defendants argued that the
plaintiff's claim did not mention GARA, but that the plaintiff's
argument was framed in a manner designed to satisfy GARA's
knowing misrepresentation exception.' 94  The defendants
claimed that whether a GARA exception is satisfied is a federal
question because the exception creates a "federal condition pre-
cedent that Plaintiff must necessarily plead and prove. Without
183 See GARA § 2(d).
184 See McAllister, supra note 3, at 315-16.
185 GARA § 2(d).
186 930 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Mich. 1996).





192 See id. at 301-02.
193 See id. at 302.
194 See id. at 304-05.
such proof, a court cannot recognize that Plaintiffs state law
cause of action has accrued and cannot permit her state-law tort
claims to be litigated." '195
The defendants' clever argument did not persuade the court.
The Wright court concluded that GARA does not create a federal
cause of action. 9 ' It is merely a statute of repose designed to
serve a "gatekeeping function.' 97 Congress did not intend to
create a body of federal common law and GARA does not pre-
empt a state's substantive law.198 Furthermore, "the mere fact
[that] GARA requires consideration of FAA regulations, does
not raise a sufficiently substantial federal issue so as to confer
federal question jurisdiction. "199 The court noted, "'GARA
erects a formidable first hurdle' to a plaintiff bringing a product
liability lawsuit against a general aviation aircraft manufacturer,
but once a plaintiff 'leaps GARA's knowing misrepresentation
exception,' her case goes forward and she 'then faces the usual
product liability obstacles.' 20 0
3. Application of GARA to Accidents Occurring Outside the United
States
Another jurisdictional issue that has arisen under GARA is
whether the Act applies to aviation accidents occurring in for-
eign countries. The United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas addressed this matter in Alter v. Bell
Helicopter Textron, Inc.20 1 The plaintiffs in Alter argued that
GARA did not apply to accidents occurring in a foreign country,
even when the suit was brought in the United States.20 2 The
court rejected the argument, holding that such an "interpreta-
tion of GARA would have the anomalous effect of preventing
litigants from bringing an action in the United States for an ac-
cident occurring in the United States while allowing litigants to
bring the same action in the United States if the accident oc-
curred abroad. 20 3
195 Id. at 304.




200 Id. (citing Rickert v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., 929 F. Supp. 380, 383
(D. Wyo. 1996)).
201 944 F. Supp. 531 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
202 See id. at 541.
203 Id.
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D. WHAT CONSTITUTES "GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT?"
GARA applies to accidents involving general aviation air-
craft.2 0 4 "General aviation aircraft" is defined by the statute as:
[A] any aircraft for which a type certificate or an airworthiness
certificate has been issued by the Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration,
[B] which, at the time such certificate was originally issued, had a
maximum seating capacity of fewer than 20 passengers, and
[C] which was not, at the time of the accident, engaged in sched-
uled passenger-carrying operations as defined under regulations
in effect under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 ... at the time of
the accident.20 5
The Act defines "general aviation aircraft" as "any aircraft
,.",2 but does not define the term "aircraft." However, the
Federal Aviation Act does define the term.2 0 7 "Aircraft" means
"any contrivance invented, used, or designed to navigate, or fly
in, the air. '' 2°1 "This broad definition includes virtually anything
that is built with the intent of departing company with the
ground," and would likely include helicopters, gliders, blimps,
and hot air balloons.20 9
To be considered a general aviation aircraft, the FAA must
have issued the aircraft a type certificate or an airworthiness cer-
tificate.2 1 "Even if a certificate is suspended or revoked, all that
appears to be required is the original issuance of the certificate
by the FAA ..... 21
A type certificate is issued by the FAA to ensure the safety of
"aircraft, aircraft engine[s], propeller[s] and appliance[s]. '212
The FAA will only issue a type certificate when it has concluded
that each submitted part "is properly designed and manufac-
tured, performs properly, and meets the regulations and mini-
mum standards prescribed. ' 2 11 "Unlike airworthiness
204 GARA § 2(a).
205 Id. at § 2(c).
206 1d.
V7 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(6) (1994).
208 Id.
209 Hedrick, supra note 15, at 388.
210 See GARA § 2(c).
21, Hedrick, supra note 15, at 390.
212 49 U.S.C. § 44704(a)(1) (1994).
213 Id. § 44704(a) (2).
certificates, type certificates are issued on approval of the de-
sign, specifications, and manufacturing process. "214
The FAA will issue an airworthiness certificate when it "finds
that the aircraft conforms with its type certificate and, after in-
spection, is in condition for safe operation. ' 215 They are issued
upon request from an aircraft's registered owner.2 1 6 This tends
to be the original manufacturer and such request is typically
made before the initial sale of the aircraft.21 7
To qualify as a general aviation aircraft, an aircraft must have
seated no more than twenty passengers at the time its type or
airworthiness certificate was issued .21  "This figure does not in-
clude seating for the pilot and copilot, as they are considered
'crewmembers,' not 'passengers. '219
The final requirement an aircraft must fulfill to be considered
a general aviation aircraft is that it must not have been engaged
in scheduled passenger-carrying operations at the time of the acci-
dent.220 Thus, "general aviation would not include scheduled air
carrier services. "221 The Code of Federal Regulations defines
"scheduled passenger operations" as "holding out to the public
of air transportation service for passengers from identified air
terminals at a set time announced by timetable or schedule pub-
lished in a newspaper, magazine, or other advertising me-
dium. '222 This requirement is included in GARA because
scheduled air services are governed by stricter safety require-
ments regarding maintenance schedules.223
214 Hedrick, supra note 15, at 390.
215 49 U.S.C. § 44704(c) (1994).
216 See id.
217 See Hedrick, supra note 15, at 390. There are two types of airworthiness
certificates, "standard" and "special." Id. at 391. Standard airworthiness certifi-
cates are issued to "aircraft type certificated in the normal, utility, acrobatic, com-
muter, or transport category .... ." Id. Special airworthiness certificates are
"primary, restricted, limited, and provisional airworthiness certificates, special
flight permits, and experimental certificates." Id. (quoting 14 C.F.R. § 21.175(a)
(1996)). This definition brings home-built aircraft under the definition of gen-
eral aviation aircraft when they are issued experimental special airworthiness cer-
tificates. See id. This is important because the kit aircraft that are so popular
today will be protected by GARA's repose period. Id. at 390-91.
218 See GARA § 2(c).
219 Hedrick, supra note 15, at 391 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 129.25 (a)(3) (1997)).
220 See GARA § 2(c) (emphasis added).
221 Hedrick, supra note 15, at 392.
222 14 C.F.R. § 108.3(e) (1997).
223 See Hedrick, supra note 15, at 393.
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E. THE EIGHTEEN-YEAR STATUTE OF REPOSE
Section 2 of the General Aviation Revitalization Act deter-
mines when the running of the statute of repose commences
and what type of conduct will trigger the statute. The section
provides that
no civil action for death or injury to persons or damage to prop-
erty arising out of an accident involving a general aviation air-
craft may be brought against the manufacturer of the aircraft or
the manufacturer of any new component, system, subassembly,
or other part of the aircraft, in its capacity as a manufacturer
224
Under GARA, an accident must have occurred during the re-
pose period for a plaintiff to retain his cause of action.225 The
date of filing is irrelevant.226 Under GARA, as long as the acci-
dent that caused the injury occurred within the repose period,
the lawsuit need only be filed within the applicable statute of
limitations. 227 GARA's eighteen-year statute of repose on manu-
facturers begins to run:
(A) from the date of delivery of the aircraft to its first pur-
chaser or lessee, if delivered directly from the manufacturer; or
(B) from the date of first delivery of the aircraft to a person
engaged in the business of selling or leasing such aircraft; or
(C) with respect to a new or replacement part, on the date of
completion of the addition or replacement. 228
When the aircraft is originally manufactured, the entire air-
craft is governed by the eighteen year repose period. As compo-
nents of the aircraft are replaced, 229 the repose period for each
new part will be a new eighteen years.230 Thus, a plaintiff has
eighteen years from the date of installation of the new part to
bring suit even if the airplane itself was older than eighteen
224 GARA § 2(a).
225 See Hedrick, supra note 15, at 394.
226 See id.
227 See id.
228 See GARA §§ 2(a)(1)(A)-(B), 2(a)(2).
229 Component parts are replaced as required by federal regulations and man-
ufacturer's recommendations. See Sanger, supra note 28, at 144. Commonly re-
placed parts include propellers and engines. See id. Hence, even though the
repose period no longer applies to the airframe, the components that make up




years.2 3 1 The plaintiff cannot allege that the plane itself was de-
fective; he is limited to arguing that the replacement part was
defective.232
A manufacturer who asserts the GARA defense will have the
burden of proving the aircraft's date of delivery.3 3 What consti-
tutes "delivery of the aircraft" may become a pivotal issue in
some GARA cases and jurisdictions may differ in their interpre-
tation of the term.234
Another term that could create confusion is the requirement
that the damage arise "out of an accident. ' 235 Although GARA
does not define "accident," the Code of Federal Regulations
provides some guidance by defining the term "aircraft accident"
as "an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft
which takes place between the time any person boards the air-
craft with the intention of flight and all such persons have dis-
embarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious
injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage. 236
GARA was probably not intended to cover only those injuries
falling under this narrow definition.2 37 Because this definition is
codified in the part of the Code of Federal Regulations regard-
ing notification and reporting of incidents and accidents, 238 it is
not binding on GARA.239 A broader definition of the term is
found in the United States Supreme Court case concerning the
Warsaw Convention, Air France v. Saks.24° In this case, the term
accident is defined as an occurrence "caused by an unexpected
or unusual event or happening that is external to the
passenger. 241
Because the average single engine aircraft is thirty-one years
old,242 the original airframe manufacturer of most aircraft is im-
mune from liability due to expiration of the statute of repose. 24
231 See MacDougall, supra note 7, at 340.
232 See id.
233 See Hedrick, supra note 15, at 394.
234 Id.
235 GARA § 2(a); Hedrick, supra note 15, at 394.
236 49 C.F.R. § 830.2 (1997).
237 See Hedrick, supra note 15, at 395.
238 49 C.F.R. § 830.1(a) (1996).
239 See Hedrick, supra note 15, at 395.
240 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
241 Id. at 405.
242 As of 1993, the average age of a single engine aircraft was twenty-seven
years. See S. REP. No. 103-202, at 3 (1993).
243 See Sanger, supra note 28, at 444; see also Hedrick, supra note 15, at 395.
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However, the component part manufacturers remain subject to
suit because many of the aircraft's parts have been replaced
within the last eighteen years.244
A thorough review of the legislative history of GARA provides
little insight as to how the eighteen year repose period was
agreed upon. In fact, the justification for the statute of repose
was articulated in House Report 103-525 (I), which states, " [i] t is
extremely unlikely that there will be a valid basis for a suit
against the manufacturer of an aircraft that is more than 18
years old. Nearly all defects are discovered during the early
years of an aircraft's life. '24 5 This so-called 'justification' ena-
bled the proponents of the legislation to claim that GARA was
fair to both consumers and manufacturers.2 46
In reality, this 'justification' is "based on a misguided pre-
sumption regarding products liability law-that all product de-
fects will surely surface within the first eighteen years of an
aircraft's life. Although this presumption may be true for manu-
facturing defects, it is by no means accurate where design de-
fects are concerned. ' 247 "When a product fails during normal
use in the early part of its life span, the reason for the failure can
almost always be attributed to a manufacturing defect. Respon-
sible manufacturers do not design their products to fail so close
to the starting line. 2 48
With [thirty-one] years representing the average age of general
aviation aircraft in this country, and forty or fifty years often rep-
resenting the useful life of such aircraft, the eighteen-year statute
of repose contained in the 1994 Act may be said to cover only
'the early part' of an aircraft's life span. If this is true, the mis-
guided presumption upon which the 1994 Act is based will leave
many legitimate design defect claimants without legal
recourse.
249
GARA's eighteen-year repose period is arguably arbitrary and
capricious. It does not correspond to the useful life of general
aviation aircraft,25 ° which is generally forty to fifty years, nor
244 See Sanger, supra note 28, at 444.
245 H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 1, at 3 (1994).
246 See Shea, supra note 16, at 784.
247 Id.
248 Id. (quotingJAMES A. HENDERSON,JR. & AARON D. TuRENZKu, PRODUCTS LIA-
BILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESSES 564 (2d ed. 1992) (emphasis deleted)).
249 Id.
250 Several state statutes of repose bar causes of action when the injury occurs
after the useful safe life of the product. See IDAHO CODE § 6-1303 (1990); KAN.
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does it relate to the average age of general aviation aircraft in
the country (thirty-one years).251 In fact, it is roughly one-half of
the latter and one-third of the former.
F. WHO MAY ASSERT THE GARA DEFENSE?
Section 2(a) of the General Aviation Revitalization Act pre-
vents suits against: "[(A)] the manufacturer of the aircraft or
[(B)] the manufacturer of any new component, system, subas-
sembly, or other part of the aircraft, in its capacity as manufac-
turer .... "252
Only manufacturers are protected by GARA. 253 GARA applies
"with respect to any new component, system, subassembly, or
other part which replaced another component, system, subas-
sembly, or other part originally in, or which was added to, the
aircraft ..... ",254 Thus, GARA protects manufacturers of aircraft
parts if an accident occurred after the part had been in use for
over eighteen years.255 When a part has been replaced by a new
part or when a new part is added to an aircraft, the eighteen-
year statute of repose applies.256 The repose period begins to
run "on the date of completion of the replacement or addition"
of those parts.257
It is unclear whether dealers, distributors, sellers, and lessors
fall within the definition of manufacturers.2 58 On its face, the
statute does not protect them; however, some states have en-
acted statutes that include these entities in their definition of
"manufacturer" for products liability purposes.259
In the aviation industry, it is common for consignment to oc-
cur-for a manufacturer to retain ownership of an aircraft while
allowing the dealer to market and sell the product. 260 Although
the manufacturer "owns" the aircraft, it has delivered the prod-
STAT. ANN. § 60-3303 (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.03 (West 1988); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 7.72.060 (West 1992).
251 See England & McNatt, supra note 26, at 325.
252 GARA § 2(a).
253 See Hedrick, supra note 15, at 396.




258 See Hedrick, supra note 15, at 397.
259 See id. In California, the term "manufacturer" includes "any... distributor
of a manufacturer who sells, transfers, or exchanges an appliance to or with a
retailer." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22410(b) (West 1997).
260 See Sanger, supra note 28, at 443.
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uct "to a person 'engaged in the business of selling or leasing
such aircraft .... ,,,261 Thus, the eighteen-year period begins
running from the time the aircraft is delivered to the dealer.
Whereas the manufacturer is protected by GARA's statute of re-
pose, the dealer is probably not.
While a manufacturer is protected by the statute, it is unclear
whether a remanufacturer 262 or component parts overhauler2 63
is protected by GARA's statute of repose.264 Arguably, they are
not protected by GARA because they are not manufacturers of
"new" components, systems, subassemblies, or other parts of the
aircraft. However, a rebuilt part could be considered "new"
under GARA.265 Because a rebuilt part must meet the same
stringent criteria as a new part, there is a strong argument that it
should be considered as such under GARA.266 If a rebuilt part is
considered a new part, the running of the statute will start anew
when the rebuilt part is placed on an aircraft.6 7
Manufacturers of overhauled parts will not be able to assert
the remanufacturers' argument. Overhauled parts are not sub-
ject to the same stringent requirements as a new part, and thus,
an overhauler's ability to assert GARA as a defense will likely be
determined on a case-by-case basis. 268 "The nature and extent of
the overhaul will be decisive. 269
GARA will only protect a manufacturer "in its capacity as a
manufacturer. ' 270 "When the manufacturer acts in any capacity
other than [in] its role in the manufacturing of the original
261 Id. (quoting GARA § 2(a)(1)(B)).
262 Although the term "remanufacturer" is not defined in any federal statute,
rule or regulation, it has been defined by some states in the aviation context. For
example, the state of Pennsylvania defines "remanufacture" as "the disassembly of
such aircraft, vehicles, parts or components, including electric or electronic com-
ponents, the integration of those parts and components with other used or new
parts or components, including the salvaging, recycling or reclaiming of the used
parts or components and the assembly of the new or used aircraft, vehicles, parts
or components." 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7201(c)(7) (West 1997). See infra
notes 349-53 and accompanying text.
263 A component parts overhauler examines the aircraft thoroughly and makes
necessary repairs or adjustments.
264 See Hedrick, supra note 15, at 398-99.
265 See id. at 403.
266 See id.
267 An entity that is not the original manufacturer, but that is in the business of
rebuilding parts, will argue that it is a manufacturer and entitled to assert the
GARA defense. See id. at 403.
268 See id.
269 Id.
270 GARA § 2(a)(2).
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part, it loses the protection of GARA to the extent that its role
caused or contributed to the accident. '271 Since many manufac-
turers provide overhaul, rebuilding services, and maintenance
services, their work in those capacities may be susceptible to suit
after the expiration of the period of repose.272
GARA does not apply to used replacement parts or addi-
tions.273 In Estate of Glover v. American Resource Corp.,274 the Cali-
fornia Superior Court held that "once a part is originally
installed on an aircraft, GARA's eighteen year statute of repose
begins to run, even when the part is removed and installed as a
used part on another aircraft. ' 275 The Glover court also held that
for GARA to apply, a defendant manufacturer who performs
maintenance on a part subsequent to manufacture must prove it
did not replace any part with a new part.276
G. EXCEPTIONS TO THE APPLICATION OF GARA's STATUTE
OF REPOSE
1. Misrepresentation and Fraud Exception
GARA allows a plaintiff to file suit against a manufacturer af-
ter the eighteen-year repose period has expired when the plain-
tiff proves the manufacturer knowingly misrepresented,
concealed, or withheld from the FAA a defect that caused the
harm. 77 This exception applies only in personal injury actions,
not property damage cases.278
The fraud exception requires the plaintiff to:
(A) prove that the manufacturer misrepresented, concealed
or withheld required information relating to a type certificate or
airworthiness certificate or an obligation with respect to the con-
tinuing airworthiness of an aircraft or a component, system sub-
assembly, or other aircraft part.
(i) The information misrepresented, concealed, or withheld
must be material and relevant;
271 Hedrick, supra note 15, at 399.
272 See id.
273 See id. at 401.
274 No. 160673, slip op. at 1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 13, 1996).
275 Hedrick, supra note 15, at 402.
276 See id.
277 See GARA § 2(b)(1).
278 See Sanger, supra note 28, at 446.
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(ii) the information must have been misrepresented know-
ingly (whether it must have been concealed or withheld know-
ingly is unclear); and
(iii) the conduct must have been causally related to the harm
suffered (i.e., death, personal injury, property damage).279
(B) plead with specificity. 20
GARA requires that a plaintiff who asserts the misrepresenta-
tion/fraud exception plead with specificity to avoid frivolous
claims or claims unsupported by the evidence.281 In other
words, the claimant must "affirmatively set forth the facts sup-
porting each allegation. 282
Plaintiffs often have a difficult time satisfying the require-
ments of this exception, because they must prove (a) the manu-
facturer knowingly misrepresented and (b) the misrepresented
condition was causally related to the injury suffered by the plain-
tiff. 283 The 'knowledge' element is difficult to satisfy because it
is unlikely that a claimant would have access to such information
from the manufacturer about the aircraft. 284 The 'causation' el-
ement is also difficult to prove.285
In aircraft accidents, the evidence may be completely destroyed
by impact or fire. Thus, product failure in the first place may be
difficult, if not impossible, to establish. When that is the case,
the burden of proof for asserting the exception of misrepresenta-
tion or failure to disclose may be insurmountable.28 6
In order for the misrepresentation exception to GARA to ap-
ply, the information at issue must have been "knowingly misrep-
resented to the Federal Aviation Administration, or concealed
279 The statute reads as follows: "if the claimant pleads... the facts necessary
to prove ... that the manufacturer ... knowingly misrepresented to the Federal
Aviation Administration, or concealed or withheld from the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration, required information .... GARA § 2(b) (1).
280 See id.
281 See Hedrick, supra note 15, at 405-06.
282 Id.
283 See Sanger, supra note 28, at 446.
284 See Hedrick, supra note 15, at 406. The question of pre-trial discovery thus
remains unanswered. How far will a court allow a plaintiff to search for informa-
tion relevant to the alleged misrepresentations? In Rickert v. Mitsubishi Heavy In-
dus., Ltd., the defendant had been "less than forthcoming" with its discovery
responses and the court ordered additional discovery. 929 F. Supp. 380, 381 (D.
Wyo. 1996).
285 See Hedrick, supra note 15, at 409.
286 Id.
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or withheld from the Federal Aviation Administration ... 287
Because the word "knowingly" only precedes the word "misrep-
resented," it is arguable that the intent element applies only to
misrepresentation and not to concealment or withholding.288
In practice, the misrepresentation exception to GARA has
been difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy. In Rickert v. Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries, Ltd.,28 9 a pilot and three passengers were killed
when a twenty-one-year-old Mitsubishi twin-engine aircraft
crashed into a mountain range near Casper, Wyoming.290 Rick-
ert claimed that the accident was caused by in-flight accumula-
tion of ice on the aerodynamic surfaces of the aircraft which
resulted in a loss of control. The plaintiff alleged that the air-
craft was negligently and defectively designed 2 1 and that Mit-
subishi had knowingly misrepresented, concealed, or withheld
required information from the FAA regarding aircraft controlla-
bility in atmospheric icing conditions.29 2 Rickert further alleged
that the defendant had submitted false flight reports to the FAA
and had failed to report numerous other defects. 29
3
The evidence presented to the court consisted of expert testi-
mony regarding the aircraft's design and whether the plane met
the FAA certification requirement.2 4 The court granted the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that "Rickert
[could not] avoid GARA's period of repose simply by dressing
up her evidence . . . as 'misrepresentations' and 'conceal-
ments.' ' 295 The court noted that the expert reports and evi-
dence, if true, at most supported an allegation that Mitsubishi
was "obstinant [sic], short-sighted, negligent and perhaps reck-
less" when it designed and manufactured the aircraft.296 How-
ever, this evidence did not prove that Mitsubishi knowingly
misrepresented to or concealed anything from the FAA.29 ' The
court further held that GARA required specificity-not merely
"innuendo and inference." 298
2111 GARA § 2 (b) (1).
288 See Hedrick, supra note 15, at 409.
289 923 F. Supp. 1453 (D. Wyo. 1996).
290 See id. at 1454.
291 See id.
292 See id. at 1457.
293 See id.
294 See id. at 1457-62.
295 Id. at 1462.
296 Id. at 1461.
297 See id. at 1461-62.
298 Id. at 1462.
19981 GARA
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AN COMMERCE
Rickert filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the defend-
ant had stonewalled the plaintiff's earlier discovery efforts.299
The court granted the motion, stayed the summary judgment
order, and allowed further discovery. 00
After discovery was completed and new evidence was heard,
the court reversed its summary judgment order.3 0 1 Rickert pro-
duced affidavits of a former Mitsubishi director of flight opera-
tions and an international vice-president.0 2 Both witnesses
claimed that Mitsubishi had withheld information from the FAA
concerning icing problems with this aircraft. 303 The court ruled
that this information satisfied the GARA requirement of produc-
ing evidence and created a genuine issue of material fact con-
cerning a known misrepresentation or concealment. 0 4
The Rickert court held that the knowing misrepresentation ex-
ception is satisfied if the plaintiff can prove with specificity the
following elements: "(1) knowledge; (2) misrepresentation,
concealment, or withholding of required information to or
from the FAA; (3) materiality and relevance; and (4) a causal
relationship between the harm and the accident."30 5 The court
noted that the plaintiff "cannot withstand a GARA-based motion
for summary judgment simply by creating a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact concerning ... negligence or strict liability. '3 0 6 This
case clearly applies the knowledge requirement to all three ele-
ments: misrepresentation, concealment, and withholding. The
court did not consider that the knowledge requirement applied
only to the misrepresentation element as the statute reads on its
face.
In Cartman v. Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div., °7 the
misrepresentation exception was again at issue. The plaintiff in
Cartman suffered injuries when the aircraft he was piloting
crashed. 0 The plaintiff presented a memorandum to the court
that was written by a representative of the defendant corpora-
2,9 See Rickert v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., 929 F. Supp. 380, 381 (D. Wyo.
1996).
300 See id.
30, See id. at 384.
302 See id. at 382.
303 See id.
304 See id. at 383.
305 Id. at 381.
306 Id.
307 No. 94-CV-72582-DT, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20189 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27,
1996).
301 See id. at *2.
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tion in order to prove that the defendant "knowingly misrepre-
sented, concealed and withheld information regarding the
safety of the composite float to and from the Federal Aviation
Administration. 3 0 9 The plaintiff argued that the memorandum
"misrepresented to the FAA that auto fuel, rather than known
design and manufacturing defects, accounted for the composite
float's propensity to cause unexpected engine failure. 310 The
plaintiff "never explicitly assert[ed]" that the defendant had
knowledge of the memorandum, but did assert that the "defend-
ant was aware of the alleged design and manufacturing defects
in the float."3"'
The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment and held that the period of repose is not waived merely
because a defendant failed to inform the FAA about possible
safety concerns regarding a part or possible misrepresentation
by other parties. 12 In order to prove misrepresentation, the
court held that a plaintiff must prove either (1) a misrepresenta-
tion or concealment of information with respect to a type of
airworthiness certificate or (2) that proof exists that the manu-
facturer violated his obligations to submit to the FAA informa-
tion with respect to the continuing airworthiness of the
component part.31 3 A plaintiff must also prove that the manu-
facturer had an affirmative duty to provide the information to
the FAA.3 4 This can be proven through statute, case or regula-
tion 5.3 1  The court refused to infer a duty to volunteer informa-
tion to the FAA that is "(1) not required by statute or regulation,
(2) not in response to a direct inquiry by the FAA, or (3) not
necessary in order to correct information previously supplied by
the defendant to the FAA. '3 6
2. Emergency Exception
The statute of repose does not apply to a passenger who is
being transported in a general aviation aircraft for the purpose
"of receiving treatment for a medical or other emergency. ' 317
309 Id. at *9-10.
310 Id. at *10.
311 Id.
312 See id.




317 GARA § 2(b)(2).
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The policy behind this exception is that a medical patient typi-
cally is unable to choose to fly in an aircraft that is less than
eighteen years old."i The emergency provision may be inter-
preted in two different ways.31" A narrow reading would exempt
a passenger only when he was being transported by the aircraft
in a medical emergency.3 20 A broader interpretation of the pro-
vision would allow suit by a plaintiff who was being transported
in a medical emergency or any other type of emergency, includ-
ing those that are not necessarily medically related.3 21 For ex-
ample, if a single-engine helicopter rescued a person from the
top of a building in a flood and the helicopter crashed, the per-
son could retain his right to sue the manufacturer.122 Thus,
under this broad statutory interpretation, recovery would hinge
on what courts consider an "emergency." Whether courts will
interpret the provision narrowly or broadly remains to be seen.
In addition, it is unclear what constitutes a "passenger. "323
Whereas pilots, flight engineers, and flight navigators are con-
sidered "flightcrew, 3 24 medical and rescue personnel are not
and thus may be considered passengers. 325 This interpretation
would be consistent with the exception's underlying policy con-
cerning lack of choice.
3. Exception for Persons Not On Board at Time of Accident
GARA only bars claims by persons who were on board the air-
craft at the time of the accident.326 Consequently, a person trav-
eling in another aircraft who is involved and injured in a mid-air
collision would not be barred from suing after the repose period
had expired. 27 Nor would a person who is on the ground at the
time of accident.3 28 This exception was likely intended to pro-
tect those plaintiffs who have not voluntarily subjected them-
selves to general aviation aircraft, while still prohibiting actions
318 See Hedrick, supra note 15, at 413.




323 See Hedrick, supra note 15, at 413.
324 See 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1998).
325 See Hedrick, supra note 15, at 413.
326 GARA § 2(b)(3).
327 See Sanger, supra note 28, at 444.
328 See id.
by those injured plaintiffs who knowingly and voluntarily choose
to fly in this class of aircraft. 29
4. Warranty Exception
A suit may be brought under a manufacturer's warranty if the
warranty period exceeds eighteen years.33 ° Since warranties of
this type typically are made through the manufacturer's "mar-
keting materials, sales presentations, or formal written warran-
ties[,]" litigation under this exception will likely be concerned
with whether a warranty exists. 1 Whether a warranty exists will
be determined by the provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code, which define the requirements of a warranty.
33 2
VI. THE EFFECTS OF GARA
A. GARA's EFFECT ON INDUSTRY LIABILIYy
Although GARA was intended to free up money for research,
development, and production of general aviation aircraft, there
remain powerful incentives for the "Big Three" to focus their
efforts on turbine and jet aircraft production: profitability and
marketability. 3 Single-engine aircraft are neither as profitable
nor as marketable as turbine and jet aircraft.3 3 4 "GARA simply
frees up funds previously used in litigation defense" for use in
producing turbine and jet aircraft, for which there is proven
market demand. 5 There is no requirement that these estab-
lished manufacturers re-start production of light piston air-
craft. 3 6 "Established manufacturers' willingness to rise to the
challenge of engaging in large scale production to replace aging
general aviation fleets is questionable. More likely, these manu-
facturers may use the reduced liability savings to pad more prof-
itable ventures. ' 33
7
329 See id. at 444-45.
330 See GARA § 2(b)(4); see also Sanger, supra note 28, at 446.
331 Sanger, supra note 28, at 446.
332 See id.
333 See McAllister, supra note 3, at 316.
334 See id.
335 Id. at 319.
336 See id. "It is difficult to believe that the primary sponsors of the relief legis-
lation did not strike some bargain with Cessna and the other manufacturers to
open new production facilities and provide new jobs as part of the package for
their support." Tarry & Truitt, supra note 23, at 198.
337 McAllister, supra note 3, at 316-17.
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It is unlikely that purchasers of general aviation aircraft will be
provided new product choices as a result of GARA."3 s The "Big
Three" have no incentive to expend their resources on new,
state-of-the-art product lines. 39 In fact, just the opposite is true.
Producing new lines exposes them to liability. They are thus
more likely to re-produce twenty-plus year-old designs (if, in
fact, they resume production of light piston aircraft at all). 4°
B. GARA's EFFECT ON SMALL MANUFACTURERS
GARA does nothing to bolster opportunities for new manu-
facturers and suppliers eager to enter the market. For those
start-up manufacturers and suppliers, eighteen years of liability
exposure must be factored into financial plans and could be
prohibitive. 41 Because insurers are unwilling to insure unless
there is a proven track record of safe operation, these new man-
ufacturers and suppliers will likely find themselves unable to
enter the market.3 42 This effectively
makes 'Big Three' 1970's product lines freshly competitive in a
market better suited to innovation and small production runs.
The threat of 'Big Three' production of proven product lines
may force small manufacturers to leave the market or abort start-
up, with no assurance [that] the 'Big Three' will re-start large-
scale production or ensure the marketability of light piston gen-
eral aviation aircraft.343
"This is unfortunate. Small manufacturers are the only innova-
tors in the industry, and their continued success and viability is
put in jeopardy by GARA. 3 44
C. GARA's EFFECT ON COMPONENT PARTS MANUFACTURERS
For all practical purposes, GARA does nothing to protect
manufacturers of engines and component parts from liability ex-
posure. 45 Because these parts are either replaced or ordered by
the Federal Aviation Regulations to be redesigned before eight-
een years have elapsed, these manufacturers will face continual
s38 See id. at 319.
339 See id.
340 See id.
341 See id. at 317.
'342 See id.
943 Id.
344 Id. at 319.
345 See id. at 317.
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liability exposure. 46 These component parts manufacturers will
thus become the new "deep pocket" in aviation products liability
litigation.3 4 7 They will now be bearing their pre-GARA liability
plus the redirected liability. 48 These companies' likely unwill-
ingness and/or inability to accept this shift in liability exposure
will almost certainly affect the future of GARA and the general
aviation industry as a whole.349 It will likely result in increased
insurance premiums for these actors, who will pass the costs on
to their consumers. 5 0 "The net outcome will be higher compo-
nent prices for aircraft owners." '351
Although GARA protects manufacturers of new general avia-
tion aircraft and component parts, it is unclear whether this pro-
vision protects companies that remanufacture, rebuild, or
overhaul component parts. 52 Remanufacturing consists of re-
moving a part from an aircraft and sending it "to the factory or
another parts remanufacturer who then reconstructs the com-
ponent so that it meets the same standards as a new part. Gen-
erally, remanufactured parts are viewed as functionally
equivalent to new components." '5  This process is popular be-
cause such recycled parts are less expensive than purchasing
new parts. 354 It is common in the general aviation industry for
remanufactured parts to be used. 55 For example, radios, alter-
nators, and engines may be remanufactured 56 Remanufactur-
ing may be done by both original manufacturers and third-party
remanufacturers1 57
As previously stated in Part V.F., there is no guidance as to
whether a remanufacturer or component parts overhauler is
protected by GARA's statute of repose. 58 Arguably, they are not
protected by GARA because they are not manufacturers of
"new" components, systems, subassemblies, or other parts of the
aircraft. However, a rebuilt part could be considered "new"
346 See id. at 317-18; see also Sanger, supra note 28, at 461.
347 See McAllister, supra note 3, at 318.
348 See Sanger, supra note 28, at 461.
349 See McAllister, supra note 3, at 318.
350 See Sanger, supra note 28, at 461.
351 Id.
352 See id. at 458; see also Hedrick, supra note 15, at 398-99.
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under GARA, because a rebuilt part must meet the same strin-
gent criteria as a new part.3 9 If a rebuilt part is considered a
new part, the running of the statute will start anew when a re-
built part is placed on an aircraft. 6 °
Manufacturers of overhauled parts will not be able to assert
the remanufacturers' argument. Overhauled parts are not sub-
ject to the same stringent requirements as new parts and thus,
an overhauler's ability to assert GARA as a defense will likely be
determined by evaluating the nature and extent of the overhaul
on a case-by-case basis.361
D. GARA's EFFECT ON OTHER INDUSTRY ACTORS
GARA does not insulate the aviation service industry from lia-
bility exposure. 62 Because plaintiffs join as many defendants as
possible in hopes of recovering complete financial relief, main-
tenance shops, pilots, mechanics, fixed base operators, fuel sup-
pliers, air traffic controllers, and airport authorities are easy
targets.363 "With fewer 'deep pocket' manufacturers available as
defendants, plaintiffs will resort to collecting [from] a larger
pool of smaller defendants. As most maintenance shops are
small and poorly capitalized, this vital piece of general aviation
infrastructure is exposed to much more potential liability" with
the enactment of GARA. "64
As stated previously in Part V.F., consignment commonly oc-
curs in the aviation industry-where a manufacturer retains
ownership of an aircraft while the dealer markets and sells the
product.365 Although the manufacturer "owns" the aircraft, it
has delivered the product "to a person engaged in the business
of selling or leasing such aircraft .... 366 Thus, the manufac-
turer is protected by the statute, while the dealer is probably
not.367 As a result, dealers will likely be targets for plaintiffs in
suits alleging defective aircraft. 68 The dealer will be unable to
"'59 See Hedrick, supra note 15, at 402-03.
'460 An entity that is not the original manufacturer, but that is in the business of
rebuilding parts, will argue that it is a manufacturer and entitled to assert the
GARA defense. See id. at 403.
361 See id.
362 See McAllister, supra note 3, at 318.
363 See id.; see also Sanger, supra note 28, at 460.
364 McAllister, supra note 3, at 318.
365 See supra Part V.F.; see also Sanger, supra note 28, at 443.
366 GARA § 2(a)(1)(B); see also Sanger, supra note 28, at 443.
367 See Sanger, supra note 28, at 443.
- See id. at 461.
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split payment of a plaintiff's judgment with the manufacturer
and will be unable to recover contribution from the manufac-
turer. 69 Because the manufacturer is immune from liability, the
dealer will be responsible for bearing the entire burden of a
judgment in those states with joint and several liability laws.3
The dealer will also bear the entire cost of defending the suit. 7 1
This could result in the "elimination of independent dealers
and implementation of factory direct retail sales."
372
However, "[w] hile GARA affords protection to manufacturers
in their capacity as manufacturers, that protection may not in-
clude retail sales activity. '3 73 A literal interpretation of the stat-
ute indicates that only those activities directly related to the
manufacture of the aircraft will be shielded under GARA.374
Thus, "once the manufacturer begins selling the aircraft, it
again becomes vulnerable to suit. '3 75 Plaintiffs will likely at-
tempt to circumvent the statute by suing the manufacturer in its
capacity as a retailer and alleging strict tort liability and/or fail-
ure to inform and warn. Should the courts, however, decide to
interpret the statute as including 'retail sales' in its definition of
'manufacturing', independent dealers will be subjected to con-
ducting business on an uneven playing field. 376 This could have
a devastating effect on independent dealers.377
Pilots are also likely to become targets of aviation litigation as
a result of GARA. General aviation insurance companies have
already announced that pilots and mechanics will be subject to
insurance premium increases as a result of the enactment of
GARA. 378
A manufacturer's employees may also be held individually lia-
ble for product failures under GARA.3 79 GARA's statute of re-
pose reallocates the risk of accident from the manufacturer of
the aircraft onto everyone else associated with the aircraft.3 10
369 See id. at 461-62.
371 See id. at 462.
371 See id.
372 Id.
373 Id. at 463.
374 See id.; see also GARA § 2(a) ("no civil action ... may be brought against the
manufacturer... in its capacity as a manufacturer .....
375 Sanger, supra note 28, at 463.
376 See id.
377 See id.
378 See id. at 460.
379 See Pounian & Rodriquez, supra note 4, at 161.
380 See Sanger, supra note 28, at 463.
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E.. GARA's EFFECT ON CONSUMERS
Oftentimes, the consumers of general aviation aircraft be-
come plaintiffs when accidents occur. The policy behind pre-
cluding consumer accident victims from recovering from
manufacturers even when there existed a legitimate design or
manufacturing defect is that the consumers voluntarily assumed
the risk of the accident."' The consumer is assumed to have
accepted the risk of accident voluntarily and is presumed to
know the age of the aircraft and its component parts.38 2 How-
ever, it is likely that a consumer and certainly a passenger will
not have this information."' Many aircraft manufactured in the
1970s look virtually identical to those manufactured in the late
1980s-"general aviation aircraft.., have changed very little in
the past twenty-five years."38 4 "Even pilots have difficulty distin-
guishing the two generations of aircraft, let alone the average
business traveler."3 "[A] passenger may board a twenty-year
old aircraft and be precluded from filing suit even though that
person is under the impression that the aircraft is relatively
new."386
VII. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO GARA
A. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE OF REPOSE
Whereas a statute of limitations extinguishes, after a period of
time, the right to bring an accrued cause of action, a statute of
repose limits potential liability by restricting the time during
which a cause of action can arise.387 A statute of repose cuts off
a plaintiff's right to bring a cause of action after a specified time,
measured from the delivery of a product, regardless of the time
of accrual of the cause of action. 8  It "extinguishes a [plain-
tiffs] cause of action before it can even arise. '"389
38s See id. For a more in-depth discussion on the topic of allowing informed
consumers to allocate their own risk regarding defective products, see Alan
Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J.
353 (1988).
382 See Sanger, supra note 28, at 463.
383 See id.
384 Id. at 463-64.
385 Id. at 463.
386 Id. at 464.
387 See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1411 (6th ed. 1990).
388 See id.
389 Sanger, supra note 28, at 447.
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To date, there have been no reported cases challenging the
constitutionality of GARA. Since most tort law, and thus most
statutes of repose, are governed by state law, most constitutional
challenges to statutes of repose have been brought in state
courts.3 0 These challenges have typically been based on theo-
ries of "denial of due process, denial of access to the courts, tak-
ing of property, and violations of equal protection." '39 1 State
courts are split in their decisions regarding the constitutionality
of the statutes-some have found them constitutional3 2 while
others have ruled that statutes of repose violate the Constitu-
tion.393 Because GARA is a federal statute, any challenge to its
constitutionality will be governed by the United States Constitu-
tion. Challenging a federal statute of repose under the United
States Constitution will prove much more difficult than chal-
lenging a state statute of repose under a state constitution for a
number of reasons.
1. Open Courts/Due Process
Statutes of repose foreclose a plaintiffs ability to recover for
an injury before one even occurs, whereas a statute of limitation
punishes a plaintiff for not pursuing his claim in a timely fash-
ion.3 94 This fundamental difference arguably denies plaintiffs
due process in seeking a remedy.3 95 Thirty-seven state constitu-
tions contain provisions that provide (1) that all courts shall be
open and (2) that every person shall have a remedy by due pro-
cess of law.396 These provisions are often referred to as "open
courts" clauses and "remedies" clauses and are intended to guar-
antee citizens "access to the courts and a judicial procedure
based on fairness and equality." '97 Several state supreme courts
390 See id. at 448-49.
391 Id. at 449.
392 See Anderson v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 766 P.2d 637 (Colo. 1988); Kelemen v.
Rimrock Corp., 542 A.2d 720 (Conn. 1988); Olsen v.J.A. Freeman Co., 791 P.2d
1285 (Idaho 1990); Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 1981).
393 See Sanger, supra note 28, at 448-49; see also Lankford v. Sullivan, Long &
Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982); Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 861
P.2d 625 (Ariz. 1993); Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla.
1980); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288 (N.H. 1983); Hanson v.
Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319 (N.D. 1986); Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 639
N.E.2d 425 (Ohio 1994); Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I.
1984); Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985).
394 See Sanger, supra note 28, at 449.
395 See id.
396 See Lankford, 416 So. 2d at 999.
397 Berry, 717 P.2d at 674-75.
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have found their respective state statutes of repose unconstitu-
tional under a rational relation test because they violated the
Constitution's open courts provisions or denied the plaintiffs
due process.39 However, there is no corollating federal open
courts provision, and thus plaintiffs will not be able to challenge
the GARA's statute of repose on this basis.
Generally, state courts have collapsed their consideration of
state open courts provisions and due process challenges into
one inquiry.39 9 Therefore, the only way a federal court could
find GARA's statute of repose unconstitutional is to find access
to the courts implicit in the federal due process clause.4"'
2. Property Rights
Courts tend to hold that "an unaccrued cause of action is not
a property right."4 1 A person has no property right in a com-
mon law rule.4 12 "Since an unaccrued cause of action is not a
property right, enacting a statute that prevents the cause of ac-
tion from arising is not a[n unconstitutional] taking, for which
compensation is due. 40 3
3. Equal Protection
Challengers to state statutes of repose often base their attack
on violation of equal protection grounds under state constitu-
tions. The plaintiffs typically challenge the statutes of repose by
alleging that the statute creates two classes of individuals, those
who are injured within the repose period and those who are
not.40 4 These statutes tend to be held unconstitutional when the
state courts analyze the statutes under an intermediate standard
of review, 4 5 which requires the statute of repose to be substan-
tially related to a legitimate governmental interest. Because the
398 See Lankford, 416 So. 2d at 1004; Hazine, 861 P.2d at 629; Heath, 464 A.2d at
299; Brennaman, 639 N.E.2d at 430; Berry, 717 P.2d at 676.
399 See Sanger, supra note 28, at 449.
400 See id. at 455.
401 Id. at 453.
402 See Berry , 717 P.2d at 675-76 (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,
428 U.S. 1, 16 (1976); Second Employers' Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 50 (1912)).
403 Sanger, supra note 28, at 453.
404 See id. at 454; Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 326-27.
405 See Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 325 (N.D. 1986) (applying
an intermediate standard of review because it involved the important issues of
human life and safety. The court rejected the notion that a statute of repose was
merely an economic matter.); see also Lankford, 416 So. 2d at 999-1001; Heath, 464
A.2d at 294-95; Berry, 717 P.2d at 680-83.
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right to sue or recover is not a fundamental right and because
accident victims are not considered a suspect class under the
United States Constitution, the federal judiciary would be re-
quired to apply a rational relation test to any GARA challenge
based on equal protection grounds. This standard is much eas-
ier to satisfy than the states' intermediate test, and thus, any fed-
eral equal protection challenge to GARA will likely be rejected.
When the federal government enacted GARA, it imposed
onto accident victims a legal rule in an area of the law that tradi-
tionally has been governed by the individual states. State consti-
tutions and state courts have been tailored over time to meet the
needs of their citizens in the tort arena. Whereas plaintiffs often
have been able to successfully challenge state statutes of repose
under their state constitutions and in their state courts, this fed-
eral interference into tort law effectively bars plaintiffs from
challenging the statute of repose on constitutional grounds. 06
B. CIRCUMVENTING THE STATUTE OF REPOSE
Creative lawyering can occasionally result in circumvention of
the statute of repose in courts that disfavor such statutes. 407 For
example, in Driver v. Burlington Aviation, Inc.,4 °8 the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals held an aircraft manufacturer liable, even
though the state statute's repose period had expired, by con-
cluding that the instruction manual, not the aircraft, was the de-
fective product at issue.40 9 In this case, Philip Driver was severely
injured when a Cessna model 152 aircraft, in which he was a
passenger, lost control and crashed. 410 The operator of the air-
craft had rented it from the defendant.4 1' The plaintiffs argued
that the aircraft's information manual was defective because it
omitted information concerning dangers associated with the air-
406 When federal courts have evaluated the constitutionality of state statutes of
repose under the United States Constitution, they have consistently upheld their
constitutionality. See Schamel v. Textron-Lycoming, 1 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 1993);
Eaton v. Jarvis Prods. Corp., 965 F.2d 922 (10th Cir. 1992); Harris v. Black Claw-
son Co., 961 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1992); Dinh v. Rust Int'l Corp., 974 F.2d 500 (4th
Cir. 1992); Alexander v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 952 F.2d 1215 (10th Cir. 1991);
Pitts v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, Pitts v. GAF
Corp., 464 U.S. 1003 (1983).
407 See Sanger, supra note 28, at 464.
408 430 S.E.2d 476 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
409 See id. at 483.
410 See id. at 479.
411 See id.
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craft.412 The court held the manufacturer of the manual
(Cessna) liable under a products liability theory because the
"product to which the action applies is not the aircraft as Cessna
suggests, but the instructional manual. 41  There were no alle-
gations that the aircraft was in any way defective.414 In fact, the
plaintiffs conceded that the aircraft did not function defectively
or improperly under the circumstances.4' 5 They argued only
that the manual did not mention the aircraft's propensity for
icing in such meteorological and operational conditions. 416
The court held that the 'defective product' at issue in the case
was the information manual, not the aircraft. 417 Thus, the stat-
ute of repose began on the date the manual was purchased,
which allowed the plaintiffs to pursue their cause of action.418
"For the purposes of GARA, the Driver ... decision is impor-
tant because it suggests that courts may be willing to utilize items
such as a manual to circumvent a statute of repose."41 9 "[A]
plaintiff [can] pursue almost any [cause of] action by pleading
that the manual was purchased within the last eighteen years
and was defective because it failed to warn of a possible dan-
ger. ' 420 The net result of the Driver rationale "would be to
render GARA meaningless. 4 21
Although the Driver court accepted the "manual as a replace-
ment part" argument, plaintiffs have asserted the argument in a
number of federal jurisdictions, all of which have rejected it.42 2
For example, the southern district of Texas rejected the argu-
ment in Alter v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.,423 a case involving the
GARA defense.
In Alter, the plaintiffs' husbands were killed in a crash involv-
ing a Bell helicopter.4 24 The surviving wives alleged that defend-







419 Sanger, supra note 28, at 464.
420 Id. at 465-66.
421 Id. at 466.
422 See, e.g., Schamel v. Textron-Lycoming, 1 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 1993); Alexan-
der v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 952 F.2d 1215 (10th Cir. 1991); Kochins v. Linden-
Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir. 1986); Butchkosky v. Enstrom Helicopter
Corp., 855 F. Supp. 1251 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
423 944 F. Supp. 531 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
424 Id. at 533.
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ant Bell (1) carelessly designed, manufactured, tested and sold
the aircraft and its component parts and (2) carelessly and neg-
ligently issued maintenance manuals that contained a mislead-
ing statement that proximately caused the helicopter crash in
which their husbands were killed.425 They asserted that the
manuals were issued within the eighteen-year limitation period
because the defendant reissued and revised them approximately
twice a year since 1974.426 The plaintiffs argued that GARA did
not preclude their defective marketing and failure to warn
claims because the maintenance manual revision is a "new com-
ponent, system, subassembly, or other part which replaced an-
other component, system, subassembly, or other part originally
in, or which was added to, the aircraft . . ." and to which the
eighteen-year repose period separately applies.42 v
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument and held that
"manufacturers' maintenance.., manuals are not a 'separate'
product or component upon which [the] plaintiffs may base a
claim to avoid a repose statute. '428 The instructions are not con-
sidered a "product" as defined by the Act.4 29 The court noted
that several other federal jurisdictions had rejected the type of
argument that the plaintiffs were asserting.430
The court distinguished the Driver case because the plaintiffs
in Driver did not contend that the aircraft was in any way defec-
tive.4 3 ' The plaintiffs in Driver did not argue that the manual
was a defective replacement part to an aircraft, but that it was a
defective product in and of itself.
Critics of the Alter decision have argued that
[t]he continued maintenance of an aircraft in accordance with
the manufacturer's manual is no less significant than the replace-
ment of aircraft parts. When a part is no longer safe, it is re-
placed. When a maintenance procedure is no longer safe, it is
revised. Yet a replacement part will trigger a new period, while
under Alter, a revised manual will not, even when the overall ef-
fect on safety may be the same. Insufficient maintenance manu-
als may contribute to a product's failure, just as a design or
manufacturing defect would cause a product to fail.43 2
425 See id. at 537.
426 See id.
427 Id. at 538 (citing GARA § 2(a)(2)).
428 Id.
429 See id. at 539.
43o See id. at 538-40.
431 See id. at 540.
432 Hedrick, supra note 15, at 396.
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Despite the Alter decision, a plaintiff may still be able to cir-
cumvent GARA's statute of repose by suing the manufacturer
who issued the manual if he sues within the eighteen-year pe-
riod and does not allege defects in the aircraft. This is precisely
the theory that allowed the plaintiff in Driver to recover.
Arguably, the manual can also be used to circumvent the stat-
ute by alleging that it is a warranty.
VIII. TOP ELEVEN REASONS WHY GARA IS WRONG
GARA's enactment was based on a number of fallacious theo-
ries. Because the purpose and policy behind GARA are based
on erroneous information, the intended effects of it might
never be realized.
A. MYTH #1: GARA WILL REMEDY THE PRODUCTS
LIABILITY CRISIS.
REIAIT: If the real purpose of GARA was to cure the prod-
ucts liability crisis, it will certainly prove not to be an effective
remedy. The manufacturers insist that the industry's decline
was due to large products liability judgments and litigation de-
fense costs. If so, what will protect manufacturers from suits in-
volving the "80,000 to 100,000 general aviation aircraft that are
too young to be affected by the statute of repose?" 43 3 Not
GARA. What will protect manufacturers like Cessna when, and
if, they begin manufacturing thousands of new aircraft?4 34 Not
GARA. In fact, if GARA is supposed to revitalize the general
aviation industry by enabling it to produce thousands of new
aircraft, what is to prevent the same cycle from happening
again? These manufacturers will be subject to suit on thousands
of new aircraft which will increase litigation defense costs and
insurance premiums-the very things that purportedly de-
stroyed the industry in the first place.
With the enactment of GARA, the general aviation industry is
destined to repeat history by flooding the market with
thousands of new aircraft. This so-called revitalization will likely
lead to yet another crash. But this time, the trial lawyers will not
be to blame for the demise of an industry. Perhaps the industry
and society would be better served by re-evaluating general avia-
tion's management and business decisions than by re-victimizing
victims.
433 Shea, supra note 16, at 787.
434 See id.
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B. MYTH #2: 100,000 JOBS HAD BEEN LOST IN THE GENERAL
AVIATION INDUSTRY DUE TO EXCESSIVE LIABILITY
EXPOSURE PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF
GARA.
REALITY: The manufacturing industry never provided any
studies to Congress to substantiate this job-loss figure. On April
2, 1996, Cessna, Mooney, Beech, and Piper were asked to submit
their "figures reflecting on an annualized basis, the total em-
ployment by [their] compan[ies] from 1978 through 1995. '43
Cessna responded on April 15, 1996, by saying, "[w]e decline to
provide the information you have requested. ' ' 436 Mooney re-
plied on April 9, 1996, stating, "Mooney Aircraft Corporation is
a privately-owned company and as such is prohibited from dis-
closing financial and certain other information. 4 7  Beech
never responded. Piper responded on April 4, 1996, with the
following figures: As of 1978 Piper employed 3219 workers. In
1991, the year Piper entered bankruptcy, the company em-
ployed only 140 workers. By 1995 after its emergence from
bankruptcy, Piper was employing 616 workers, resulting in a to-
tal loss of 2603 jobs.43 8
Cessna and Beech are both headquartered in Wichita, Kansas
(Sedgwick County). Examination of Sedgwick County's employ-
ment figures revealed that in 1978, the year general aviation
production peaked at 17,811 aircraft,43 9 183,187 workers were
employed. By 1994, the year GARA was enacted, 210,146 people
were employed in the county. Sedgwick County was not ren-
dered a jobless wasteland by our tort system prior to the enact-
ment of GARA.4 40
435 Daniel Donnelly, General Aviation Revitalization Act-Fiend or Foe?, in 1996
ANNUAL CONVENTION NATIONAL COLLEGE OF ADVOCACY 1629, 1632 (ATLA Meet-
ing, Boston, Mass. July 27-31, 1996) (quoting Letters from Attorney Daniel Don-
nelly to Cessna Aircraft Co., Beech Aircraft Corp., Mooney Aircraft Corp., and
Piper Aircraft Corp. (Apr. 2, 1996)).
436 Id. at 1632 n.16 (quoting Letter from T. W. Wakefield, Vice President and
General Counsel, The Cessna Aircraft Co., to Attorney Daniel Donnelly (Apr. 15,
1996)).
437 Id. at 1632 n.17 (quoting Letter from Kyle M. Jaster, Chief Financial Of-
ficer, Mooney Aircraft Corp., to Attorney Daniel Donnelly (Apr. 9, 1996)).
438 See id. at 1632 n.18 (citing Letter from Patrick H. Faller, Director of Human
Resources, The New Piper Aircraft, Inc., to Attorney Daniel Donnelly (Apr. 4,
1996)).
439 See General Aviation Manufacturers Association, 1997 STATISTICAL DATA
BOOK 4 (1997).
440 See Donnelly, supra note 435, at 1632.
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Furthermore, The World Aviation Directory calculates the
change in employment of each of the following general aviation
from 1986-1994 manufacturers as follows: Cessna -2400; Beech
+1450; Piper -400; and Mooney +450. This represents a total job
loss during that period of 900 jobs, hardly a figure approaching
100,000.441
C. MYTH #3: THE GENERAL AVIATION INDUSTRY WAS FACING
FINANCIAL DEVASTATION AS A RESULT OF ITS EXPOSURE
TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAWSUITS.
REALITY: According to GAMA, in 1978, the net billings for
general aviation aircraft were $1,781,200,000. In 1994 they were
$2,357,100,000.442 Even Russell W. Meyer, CEO of Cessna, ac-
knowledged this success at a hearing before the Senate Subcom-
mittee on Aviation by saying, "[W]e are doing very well at
Cessna. We are building a line of business jets. We happen to
be the world's leader in the industry. We have something like
sixty percent of the market, and we are very proud of our grow-
ing line of Citations. 443
D. MYTH #4: GARA WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE
MANUFACTURERS EXPERIENCED A DECREASE IN GENERAL AVIATION
SALES DUE TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY COSTS BEING TOO HIGH,
CAUSED BY A DEFECT IN THE TORT SYSTEM (RATHER THAN BY
PRODUCT DEFECTS).
REALITY: The manufacturers submitted evidence of their "ex-
orbitant" liability costs and then causally linked those costs to
the demise of the industry. There are a number of inaccuracies
in the manufacturers' evidence and rationale that makes GARA
a "solution" to a non-existent problem. Because the manufac-
turers' problems were premised on fallacial arguments, GARA
ends up being only a subsidy for manufacturers; a cure for a
non-existent disease. Applying GARA is like giving morphine to
someone who has a common cold. Sure, it feels good, but it will
not cure the cold.
The fallacy in the manufacturers' arguments for enacting
GARA concerns their calculated annual products liability costs
441 See id. at 1632 n.20.
442 See General Aviation Manufacturers Association, 1997 STATISTICAL DATA
BoOK 4 (1997).
443 Donnelly, supra note 435, at 1633.
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of $70,000 to $100,000 per unit built.444 This figure was touted
by the "Big Three" as a justification for enacting the legislation.
However, their methods for calculating this figure is
questionable ."'
Assume that a manufacturer has a fleet of 100,000 aircraft in ac-
tive service in a given year. Furthermore, assume that the same
manufacturer produces only 200 units during the year. Finally,
assume that its liability insurance premiums total $20 million per
year. If the manufacturer divides its insurance cost ($20 [mil-
lion]) by the number of units produced and sold in a given year
(200), the resulting insurance cost is $100,000 per unit of pro-
duction. This is precisely how Cessna, Piper, and Beech arrived
at such cost figures. It is important to recognize that each one of
the 100,000 outstanding aircraft represents a potential liability
suit. Any accounting system or costing scheme that allocates
these costs to current production dramatically (and artificially)
increases the cost, and perhaps the selling price, of airplanes.446
These fallacial cost figures can be very persuasive as evidence
demonstrating that the liability system is out of control.4 4 7
GAMA lobbied Congress with the following statistics: "[I]n
1976, total product liability costs, including claim and defense
costs for light aircraft airframe and component manufacturers,
were $24 million. In 1986, the total costs of product liability for
light aircraft reached $210 million. 448 Interestingly, however,
GAMA presented no data between the years of 1986 and 1994.
GAMA reported on April 19, 1996, that it had no such data.449
Furthermore, it was unable to provide a breakdown and justifi-
cation of the 1976-1986 data.45°
Also compelling are data reflecting general aircraft retail in-
creases between 1977 and 1985.451 GAMA and other propo-
nents of GARA purported that products liability increases led to
increased retail costs, resulting in such aircraft being "out of
reach" for the average American. In 1977 and 1978 annual re-
tail prices increased as follows:




448 S. REP. No. 103-202, at 3 (1993).
449 See Donnelly, supra note 435, at 1633 (citing Conversation between Ed Bo-
lan of GAMA and Attorney Daniel Donnelly (Apr. 19, 1996)).
450 See id. (citing Conversation between Ed Bolan of GAMA and Attorney
Daniel Donnelly (Apr. 19, 1996)).
451 See AIRCRAFT BLUEBOOK PRIcE DIGEST (Spring 1995).
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Cessna 210 Beech 33A Piper PA 28-181 Mooney 201
15.39% 8.05% 8.9% 9.53%
From 1979 through 1985, when products liability costs pur-
portedly "soared," prices increased annually as follows:
Cessna 210 Beech 33A Piper PA 28-181 Mooney 201
11.64% 10.45% 10.57% 13.30%
The difference in the average annual increase between 1977-
1978 (when GAMA data reflects no increase in products liability
costs) and 1979-1985 (when products liability costs "soared") are
as follows:
Cessna 210 Beech 33A Piper PA 28-181 Mooney 201
-3.75% +2.4% +1.67% +3.77%
The average annual increase in retail costs of the four models
during the products liability "crisis" was a mere +1.02%.52
Even more revealing is a comparison between the average an-
nual increases in new aircraft prices during the period 1979
through 1983 (when GAMA says products liability costs in-
creased from $25 million to $73 million annually) with the in-
creases during the period 1984 and 1985 (when GAMA says
products liability costs "soared" from $73 million to $210 million
annually) ."5
Cessna 210 Beech 33A Piper PA 28-181 Mooney 201
1979-1983
12.65% 14.31% 12.91% 13.27%
1984-1985
9.13% .79% 4.72% 13.40%
"This data at the very least suggests that the increases in the
retail prices of new aircraft during the period 1979-1985 were
not driven by products liability costs but by other, unrelated
factors. " 54
The fact that products liability costs were not responsible for
the dramatic increase in the retail price of new aircraft was inad-
vertently admitted by Charles M. Suma, President and CEO of
The New Piper Aircraft when he responded to the following
inquiry:
452 See Donnelly, supra note 435, at 1634.
453 See id. at 1633, Table 2 (citing GAMA, BRIEFING MATERIALS ON GENERAL Avi-
ATION REVITALIZATiON ACT 1).
454 Id. at 1634.
"What do you tell your owners, or any pilot who says, 'I
thought this whole product liability thing was going to result in
lower prices?"'
"I was very clear with everybody to whom we talked that its not
going to mean lower prices."455
E. MYTH #5: THE DECLINE IN GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT
SALES WAS DUE TO SOARING PRODUCTS LIABILITY COSTS.
REALITY: The decline in general aircraft aviation sales from
1978 through 1994 was due to factors unrelated to products lia-
bility costs.
1. Oversupply
The industry reached "fantastic levels of production in the
late 1970s" when manufacturers were optimistic that we had
reached an age where "owning and operating a general aviation
aircraft would come within the reach of the average Ameri-
can." '456 This optimism and accompanying surge of production
likely played a role in the downward spiral of the industry in the
1980s.157 "There is good evidence to suggest that for a number
of reasons, manufacturers and others involved in the sale of air-
craft misjudged the market and set the industry up for a bust."45
In 1986 (the year Cessna ceased producing piston aircraft),
the ratio of active certificated pilots to active aircraft reached a
twenty-six year low, falling from 5.64 pilots per aircraft in 1968
to 3.22 pilots per aircraft in 1986. This represents a decrease of
forty-two percent. In 1993, the ratio was still only 3.77 pilots per
aircraft.459 In fact, Piper's CEO, Charles M. Suma commented
on this oversupply in 1995 by declaring, "from the early 1970s
through the mid-1980s [,]... the industry was producing more
new aircraft than the market could absorb."
460
2. Failure to Implement Product Improvement and Innovation
According to Chuck Husick, former Vice-President of Cessna,
the industry failed to give its single engine customers product
455 The New Piper's Chuck Suma, AOPA PILOT, Feb. 1996, at 57, 62.
456 Tarry & Truitt, supra note 23, at 185.
457 See id. at 188-90.
458 Id. at 188.
459 See Donnelly, supra note 435, at 1635.
4- Suma Outlines Plans for New Models, New Technology from New Piper Aircraft,
WKv. Bus. AVIATION, Aug. 7, 1995, at 55.
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improvement and innovation to match its big price hikes.461
The industry saw the decline coming and rather than pushing
for new technology, it gave buyers improved doors and wind-
shields.462 As a result, "[p]ilots, businesses, flying clubs, fixed
base operations-none of them buy new airplanes because they
can get essentially the same thing for less money in an used
airplane. 463
3. High Operating Costs
Cessna's chief economist, E.F. Kraus, attributed the decline of
general aviation sales, in part, to high operating costs-e.g. fuel,
maintenance, etc.464
4. Increased Complexity of the Aviation Environment
The proliferation of various forms of restricted use airspace
and the increased regulation of airspace have also been recog-
nized as factors in the decline in aircraft sales.465
5. Abolition of Favorable Tax Treatment for Aircraft Acquisition
The elimination of the investment tax credit has significantly
affected the sale of new aircraft.466
6. Competition for Expendable Income
Competition for consumer dollars has also affected general
aviation sales. Factory-produced aircraft must now compete with
home built aircraft, which have become tremendously popular
in recent years. While the purchase and production of light pis-
ton aircraft was decreasing, "sales of light piston aircraft kits
were at an all-time high. ' 467 In the 1990s "[r] egistration and cer-
tification of . . . experimental home-built aircraft skyrock-
eted."46  Good used aircraft also increased the competition.469
461 See Weeghman, The Big Crash: Searching for the Cause of General Aviation's
Appalling Nosedive, AVIATION CONSUMER, Nov. 1, 1986, at 20.
462 See id.
463 General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1993: Hearing on H.R. 3087 Before the
House Subcomm. on Econ. and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on Judiciary, 103d
Cong. 111 (1994) (statement of Robert B. Creamer, Citizen Action).
4- See E.F. Kraus, Technical Thresholds for Revitalizing General Aviation, AIAA,
(Sept. 14-16, 1987) 2, 4.
465 See id.
466 See H.R. REP. No. 103-525(1), at 5 (1994).




A myriad of other factors contributed to the decline in new
general aviation aircraft sales. For instance, the combination of
inflation and the changes in GI Bill flight training benefits con-
tributed to the "surge in production that created an unsustain-
able production volume."47 Furthermore, "some unbelievable
[sic] bad business decisions by the manufacturers 15 to 20 years
ago" coupled with the manufacture of "some lousy products"
contributed to the industry's decline.471
The demand for newly manufactured general aviation aircraft
was not met due to several other unforeseeable factors. "Fuel
prices skyrocketed in 1979, the prime lending rate reached a
high of nineteen percent in 1981, and the nation's economy ex-
perienced negative growth" from 1980 through 1982.472 Airline
deregulation, the air traffic controllers strike of 1981, the high
rate of mergers and acquisitions in the 1980s, and descending
corporate profits between 1978 and 1986 also contributed to the
decline in general aviation sales.473
These are the factors that placed the purchase of a general
aviation aircraft "beyond the reach of even wealthier consum-
ers."474 Even without the so-called "products liability crisis," the
general aviation industry, in all likelihood, would have suffered
a dramatic decline.4 5 "Its own commercial strategy of flooding
the market in the late 1970s combined with the disastrous gen-
eral economic conditions of the early 1980s" would have
wrought havoc on the industry.4 7
6
F. MYTH #6: AIRCRAFr "PROVE" THEMSELVES WITHIN EIGHTEEN
YEARS AND THUS ARE ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY AFTER SUCH TIME.
REALITY: "Although this presumption [that an aircraft that
has not been involved in an accident within eighteen years has
proven itself to be safe] may be true for manufacturing defects,
it is by no means accurate where design defects are con-
469 In 1987 ten-year-old singles sold for only 23% of new aircraft prices. See
Donnelly, supra note 435, at 1636.
470 Tarry & Truitt, supra note 23, at 188.
471 Id. at 190 (citing Letter from John Baker, President of the Aircraft Owners
& Pilots Association, to Attorney John Howie (Sept. 29, 1988)).
472 Id. at 190.
473 See Donnelly, supra note 435, at 1637.
474 Tarry & Truitt, supra note 23, at 190.
475 Id. at 192.
476 Id.
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cerned. ' 477 "When a product fails during normal use in the
early part of its life span, the reason for the failure can almost
always be attributed to a manufacturing defect. Responsible
manufacturers do not design their products to fail so close to
the starting line."47
With [thirty-one] years representing the average age of general
aviation aircraft in this country, and forty or fifty years often rep-
resenting the useful life of such aircraft, the eighteen-year statute
of repose contained in the 1994 Act may be said to cover only
"the early part" of an aircraft's life span. If this is true, the mis-
guided presumption upon which the 1994 Act is based will leave
many legitimate design defect claimants without legal
recourse.
To assess whether an aircraft proves itself as being defect-free,
one must examine the model aircraft, not an isolated aircraft, as
was done by GARA proponents. "For example, to have looked
at a specific 'V'-tail Bonanza prior to 1980, and to have pro-
nounced that specific aircraft free from defect would have been
absurd because, as of 1980, 250 of this model aircraft had come
apart in the air due to a design defect. 480
The manufacturers also fail to understand that aircraft acci-
dents seldom have but one cause, but normally occur because,
at a point in time, several contributing causes coincide.
Aircraft defects standing alone seldom result in crashes. In the
presence of other contributing causes, however, they are lethal.
The fact that a certain latent design defect does not result in a
crash because other contributing causes are not yet present is no
evidence that the model is defect free.4 8'
G. MYlH #7: BECAUSE THE NTSB DID NOT FIND A DESIGN
DEFECT AS A PROBABLE CAUSE OF AN ACCIDENT, THE
AIRCRAFT IS DEFECT-FREE.
REALITY: In 1987, at the request of the House Aviation Sub-
committee of the Public Works and Transportation Committee,
Beech Aircraft analyzed 203 general aviation accident lawsuits
filed during the 1980s.482 Beech found that the NTSB and FAA
477 Shea, supra note 16, at 784.
478 Id.
479 Id.
480 Donnelly, supra note 435, at 1637.
481 Id.
482 See Martin, supra note 102, at 485-86.
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investigations indicated that none of the 203 accidents were
caused by design or manufacturing defects." 3
Beech's findings are more a testimonial to the ineptitude of the
manner in which the NTSB and the FAA conduct many investiga-
tions and to the success of the general aviation industry in steer-
ing investigations away from the manufacturers by having their
investigators participate, than to general aviation['s] aircrafts' be-
ing free of design and manufacturing defects. 4 '
Evidence can be found in every plaintiff's aviation trial law-
yer's files. In many cases, the NTSB found probable cause of the
crash to have been pilot error. However, through pre-trial dis-
covery and investigation, the cause is often determined to have
been a design defect in the aircraft or in its manuals. 8 5
H. MYTH #8: GARA WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE DEFENDANTS
HAVE SUCH A DIFFICULT TIME DEFENDING OLDER AIRCRAFT DUE
TO LOST OR DESTROYED INFORMATION.
REALITY: It is the plaintiff who has the burden of proof in
personal injury aviation litigation. Therefore, if information has
been lost or destroyed, it is the plaintiff who suffers most-by
losing his right to recourse.
Oftentimes in aviation cases, documents such as design draw-
ings, engineering change requests, orders, test reports, and ser-
vice history (including customer complaints and accident and
incident history) are "destroyed by manufacturers under the eu-
phemism of 'record retention' programs."4 6 The solution to
stripping an accident victim of his right to recourse because the
defendant has succeeded in disposing of the essential evidence
to prove a case against it might be the enactment of better rec-
ord retention laws. At the very least, those who destroy the evi-
dence should not have the advantage of arguing that the
absence of such evidence warrants immunity for defective
products.487
483 See id. at 486.
484 Donnelly, supra note 435, at 1638.
485 See id.
486 Id. at 1639.
487 See id.
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I. MYTH #9: PASSAGE OF GARA WILL RESULT IN AN INCREASE
IN PRODUCTION AND JOBS.
REALITY: Proponents of GARA argued that its passage would
lead to a 100,000job increase within the general aviation indus-
try. Post-enactment of GARA, those who had touted the 100,000
job-loss figure, became substantially more conservative by assert-
ing "[t]he newly-enacted general aviation product liability law
may create up to 25,000 new jobs."488
Russell W. Meyer of Cessna promised that with the passage of
GARA, Cessna would begin producing 2000 aircraft annually.48 9
However, even those within the same camp express skepticism at
this assertion. For example, when asked whether Cessna's plans
to make 2000 airplanes a year by 1997 or 1998 was likely, the
cheif executive of Lycoming replied, "No, I don't see it as sus-
tainable. At the outside, probably half of the two thousand. 490
Furthermore, no one within the industry is crazy enough to
assert that GARA would bolster the industry back to the 1978-79
annual production rate of 17,000 aircraft, even though those
production figures were used by the industry as the standard
from which the industry had fallen due to the ravages of the tort
system.49'
J. MYrH #10: PRODUCTS HA VE BEEN DESIGNED AND DEVELOPED
TO INCREASE AIR SAFETY, BUT THE MAKERS' FEAR OF EXPOSURE TO
LIABILITY HAS PREVENTED THEM FROM INTRODUCING AND
MARKETING THE PRODUCTS. IN OTHER WORDS, STRICT PRODUCTS
LIABILITY STIFLES SAFETY.
REALITY: Strict liability does not stifle safety. Statutes of re-
pose stifle safety. What incentive does a manufacturer have to
follow the aircraft after the eighteen year repose period has ex-
pired? Why spend money maintaining and inspecting such air-
craft? "Nothing in this legislation encourages the production of
better, safer aircraft" and nothing in GARA helps to ensure that
488 Clinton Signs Liability Law, Cessna Weighs New Production, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Aug. 22 1994, at 61 (emphasis added).
489 See H.R. REP. No. 103-525(11), at 5 (1994); S. REP. No. 103-202, at 2 (1993).
490 Lycoming's CEO on Competition and Cessna's Chances, AVIATION CONSUMER,
Nov. 1995, at 10.
491 See Hearing on H.R. 3087, The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1993 Before
the House Public Works and Transp. Subcomm. on Aviation, at 157 (Oct. 27, 1993)
(statement of Edward W. Stimpson, President, General Aviation Manufacturers
Association).
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the general goals of the tort system as a whole are furthered.492
There is no mention in GARA of (a) fostering innovation or
safety; (b) compensating the injured victims of defective aircraft
over eighteen years old; or (c) deterring injurers. 41 3  In fact,
GARA defeats the goals of the tort system.
GARA's statute of repose eliminates any incentive for manu-
facturers to engineer their products to be safe after the eighteen
year period expires.494 Now, manufacturers may choose to de-
sign their aircraft to last a mere eighteen years.495 Pilots who fly
an aircraft older than eighteen years are without any legal re-
dress. 496 "AOPA and the pilots it represents .. .have traded
their long-term safety and access to legal redress for industry
negligence. The AOPA and its members may have pursued a
false illusion of thousands of cheap, light pistons rolling off the
production lines. '497 GARA is an "'industrial policy' which [sic]
serves as a 'bail-out' or 'subsidies to selected industries.' 49
8
K. MYTH #11: ENACTMENT OF GARA WILL ENABLE CESSNA TO
FULFILL ITS PROMISE TO RESTART PRODUCTION OF
SINGLE-ENGINE AIRCRAFT.
REALITY: It is likely that Cessna's decision to reenter the sin-
gle-engine market was sweetened considerably by incentives of-
fered by state, county and local government "giveaways" valued
at approximately $35 million. 499 The incentives include free
land, $8.3 million in property tax abatements, $20 million in
cash, $2 million in worker training programs and a $500,000
training center.500 Thus, Cessna's ability to restart production
will likely "be shaped by more than tort reform. "501
IX. CONCLUSION
The passage of GARA has not yet resulted in a decrease in
liability insurance costs for general aviation manufacturers, as
492 Shuchman, supra note 117, at 530.
493 See id.




498 Shuchman, supra note 117, at 530.
499 See Barbara Carton, Aviation: Cessna Says It Will Make More Small Airplanes,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 1995, at B1.
500 See id.
50, Tarry & Truitt, supra note 23, at 199.
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was intended.5 °2 Insurance companies will not reduce the cost
of premiums until they know two things. First, they want to see
if the number of lawsuits is reduced substantially and second,
they want to wait for more aircraft to move into GARA's eight-
een year cutoff period.5 3 Apparently, insurance underwriters
will continue to extract high premiums until more judicial opin-
ions are handed down.50 4
Only time will tell how GARA's effects will be felt by general
aviation manufacturers, other industry actors, and consumers.
In the meantime, other reform efforts are underway in Con-
gress, such as efforts to overhaul the nation's liability laws. In
fact, the general aviation manufacturers were invited to Wash-
ington earlier this year to discuss how well GARA was working
for the industry.
Lawyers are the target for general aviation's scam, but even the biggest
scumbag ambulance-chaser can't sue a manufacturer without a plaintiff
-J. Mac McClellan, Editor, Flying Magazine, July 1993.5o5
Aviation lawsuits do not arise when air crashes do not occur.
-Daniel Donnelly, Attorney, ATLA Meeting, July 1996.5o6
502 See Charles Spence, Is Tort Reform 1
& FLYER, Mar. 21, 1997, at 28.
503 See id.
504 See id.
505 Reference on file with author.
506 Donnelly, supra note 435, at 1641,
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